United States v. Diaz-Argueta, 564 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2009) (California conviction of assault with a firearm, under Penal Code 245(a)(2), with probation on condition of serving a sentence less than one year, can constitute a "crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), and thus support a 16-level sentence enhancement for illegal reentry, even where it does not qualify as a crime of violence aggravated felony because there is no sentence imposed of one year or more); citing United States v. Pimentel-Flores, 339 F.3d 959, 960-61 (9th Cir.2003).
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2009) (superseding earlier opinion, 546 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. October 8, 2008) (non-aggravated felony may still be considered a "particularly serious crime" for purposes of withholding of removal; the Attorney General may determine by adjudication that a crime is "particularly serious" without classifying it as such by regulation).
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2009) (superseding earlier opinion, 546 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. October 8, 2008) (court of appeal lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of a "particularly serious crime" determination for purposes of withholding of removal).
United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. Apr. 9, 2009) (to warrant reversal under the "plain error" test, the error must affect the defendant's substantial rights, i.e., there must exist "a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the district court would have imposed a different, more favorable sentence."); citing United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 447 (1st Cir.2007)).
United States v. Guerrero-Robledo, 565 F.3d 940 (5th Cir. Apr.
United States v. Munoz-Ortenza, 563 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 2009) ("We need not decide here whether "minor" as used in the enumerated category of "sexual abuse of a minor" means those under sixteen versus those under seventeen. We can say that "minor" in this context does not include all persons under eighteennamely, seventeen-year-olds. We are mindful that in many contexts a minor is defined as a person under eighteen. See Blacks Law Dictionary 997 (6th ed. 1990) ("In most states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of 18 . . . .").
Vasquez-Martinez v. Holder, 564 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2009) (burden of production of evidence of aggravated-felony bar to cancellation of removal lies on noncitizen: "Second, neither Cisneros-Perez nor any case in this Circuit establishes the proposition that the initial burden of production of evidence that the alien is ineligible for discretionary relief lies with the government. Such a conclusion does not flow from the language of the statute or the concomitant regulation."), citing 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. 1240.8(d).
Vasquez-Martinez v. Holder, 564 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2009) (whether noncitizen was convicted of an offense that could be considered an aggravated felony, where elements of statute described an aggravated felony but the judgment lacked essential elements of the offense, was a question of fact over which the court lacked jurisdiction).
Vasquez-Martinez v. Holder, 564 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2009) (Texas conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, under Health & Safety Code 481.112(a), is a drug-trafficking "aggravated felony" under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), which disqualifies the noncitizen from cancellation of removal for Lawful Permanent Residents under INA 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.
Lockhart v. Napolitano, 561 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2009) (noncitizen whose citizen spouse filed necessary immediate relative form, but then died within two years of qualifying marriage, remained spouse for purposes of adjudication of noncitizens's petition to adjust status to lawful permanent resident. Immigration and Nationality Act, 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)), agreeing with Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006), disagreeing with Robinson v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358 (3d Cir.2009).