Gaiskov v. Holder, 567 F.3d 832 (7th Cir.

Arellano-Hernandez v. United States, 564 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. May 5, 2009) (VAWA special rule cancellation is an application for relief separate from non-LPR cancellation; VAWA application was untimely when filed after deadline for relief filed by IJ, even though non-LPR cancellation application had been timely filed).

Vargas v. Holder, 567 F.3d 387 (8th Cir. May 20, 2009) (BIA did not abuse discretion in denying motion to reopen based on fact that respondents daughter had been involved in a serious car accident where daughter was neither a USC or LPR child, and therefore was not a person for whom hardship could be shown).

United States v. Medina-Villa, 570 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009) (California conviction of lewd act with a minor under 14, in violation of Penal Code 288(a), constituted "sexual abuse of a minor," qualifying as a "crime of violence" that warranted a sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2 in the sentence for illegal reentry after deportation), following United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Medina-Villa, 570 F.3d 213 (9th Cir. June 23, 2009) (sexual abuse of a minor has the same meaning in the immigration and sentencing contexts - except as it concerns statutory rape in the immigration context; as generically defined, the term requires three elements - sexual conduct, against a minor, that constitutes abuse [physical or psychological harm]), distinguishing Estrada- Espinosa,546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008), which applied 18 U.S.C. 2243 to define "sexual abuse of a minor" in the context of a statutory rape conviction.

Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. May 8, 2009) (BIA made legal error by overlooking and mischaracterizing medical facts relevant to determination of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for non-LPR cancellation of removal)

Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. May 8, 2009) ("Under our decision in Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006), that the REAL ID Act restores our jurisdiction to review "constitutional claims or questions of law," 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), and our decision in Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2008), that we can review the determination of whether "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is present in those rare cases where a BIA decision rests on fact-finding "which is flawed by an error of law," id. at 40")

United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. May 20, 2009) (district court had no authority to order that the supervised release term of illegal reentry sentence be tolled as long as defendant remained outside of the United States following his possible removal after his prison term, because tolling is not a "condition" of supervised release within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 3583(d)).

United States v. Ventura, 565 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2009) (in considering whether state conviction falls within federal statutory category for criminal sentencing purposes, under the categorical analysis, the state label or name for the offense does not control), citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).

United States v. Andrade-Aguilar, 570 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. May 27, 2009) (defendant's first state drug possession conviction was not "final" before commission of second possession offense, and thus second offense could not be aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.