Berhe v. Gonzales,
___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2729689 (1st Cir. Sept. 26, 2006) (Massachusetts
1996 conviction of misdemeanor simple possession of crack
cocaine under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 34, and Massachusetts
2003 misdemeanor conviction of simple possession of crack
cocaine, were not aggravated felony drug trafficking convictions
under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Clase-Espinal, 115 F.3d
1054 (1st Cir. June 19, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 957
(1997) (Texas felony conviction for possession of cocaine,
under Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115(f) (1996), was
an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).

United States v. Cuevas, 75
F.3d 778 (1st Cir. Feb. 7, 1996) (Rhode Island second conviction
of drug possession constituted an aggravated felony under
INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) for illegal
re-entry sentence enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).

United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d
361 (1st Cir. Jan. 30, 1996) (Rhode Island conviction of felony
drug possession offense that would only be a misdemeanor under
federal law but was felony under laws of convicting state
constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).

United States v. Smith, 36 F.3d 128 (1st
Cir. Sept. 7, 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1008 (1994) (Rhode
Island conviction of felony drug possession offense that would
only be a misdemeanor under federal law but was felony under
laws of convicting state constituted an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), for
illegal re-entry sentence enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(2)).

United States v. Forbes, 16
F.3d 1294 (1st Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (New York second conviction
for criminal possession of controlled substance under N.Y.
Penal Law § 220.09 was punishable under Controlled Substances
Act as a felony and, therefore, defendants conviction qualified
as an aggravated felony justifying enhanced sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 for illegal re-entry purposes).

Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33 (1st
Cir. Oct. 13, 1992) (Rhode Island conviction of possession
of a controlled substance, in violation of R.I.Gen.Laws §
21-28-4.01(C)(1)(a), was a felony under state law and would
have been a felony under federal law, because of two prior
drug convictions, and therefore constituted an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

Durant v. ICE, 393 F.3d 113, 114 n.1 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2004) (court declined to address whether two state simple possession convictions constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, so this question is still open in the Second Circuit); contra, Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 385 (BIA 2007), citing United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (second possession conviction constitutes aggravated felony for sentencing purposes only).
Thanks to Jared Brown.

United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81 (2d
Cir. Dec. 24, 2002) (New York convictions for misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance, under New York Penal
Law § 221.10, 221.15, 221.40 (2000), constituted aggravated
felonies warranting 8-level enhancements under U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b) of defendants sentence for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Saenz-Mendoza,
287 F.3d 1011 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (Utah misdemeanor
conviction of child abuse, cruelty toward a child, constituted
an "aggravated felony" as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentence enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), for illegal re-entry).