United States v. Sanchez,
179 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 26, 2001) (Texas felony conviction
for possession of cocaine for personal use was not an aggravated
felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (effective Nov. 1,
2001), requiring eight-level increase in offense level of
illegal re-entry conviction, since the new Guidelines in U.S.S.G.
United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d
142 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880, 120
S.Ct. 191 (1999) (New York conviction of felony attempted
criminal possession of cocaine in the first degree, in violation
of N.Y. Penal Law § 110.05(1), constituted an "aggravated
felony " under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B),
justifying 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. Mar.
22, 1996) (New York conviction of possession of a controlled
substance in the second degree, in violation of N.Y.Pen.L.
§ 220.18, that was felony under state law but not federal
law, did not qualify as an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), for purposes of deportation), overruling
Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994).
Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. July
12, 1994) (New York conviction that was felony under state
law, but misdemeanor under federal law, qualified as conviction
of "aggravated felony" under statute regarding automatic
stay of deportation), overruled by Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d
315 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 1996).
Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) (New
Jersey conviction for possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute could not be determined to be aggravated felony
since court could not determine from state court judgment
whether crime could be categorized as a felony under state
law involving "drug trafficking").
Gerbier v. Holmes,
280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2002) (Delaware conviction of
"trafficking in cocaine," in violation of Del.Code
Ann. tit. 16, § 4753A(2)(a), that was based on possession
of between 5 and 50 grams of cocaine, did not constitute an
"aggravated felony " under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C.
Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d
130 (3d Cir. Jan. 2, 2001) (New York second misdemeanor conviction
for distribution of 30 grams or less of marijuana without
remuneration was not for a hypothetical offense punishable
as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act and
therefore was not an "aggravated felony" under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) for immigration
purposes).
United States v. Amaya-Portillo, 423 F.3d
427 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2005) (Maryland conviction of misdemeanor
simple possession of cocaine, in violation of Md.Code, Art.
27, 287(e), was not an aggravated felony for sentencing purposes,
as the state offense is not a felony, even though the offense
was punishable by up to four years imprisonment).
United States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506 (4th
Cir. Jan. 16, 2003) (Virginia conviction of simple possession
of an unknown quantity of cocaine, a controlled substance,
a felony under state law, Va.Code § 18.2-250(a), constituted
an aggravated felony, for purposes of enhancing a sentence
for illegal re-entry pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, even though
it would only have been chargeable as a misdemeanor in federal
court).
United States
v. Arizaga-Acosta, 436 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2006) (federal
conviction for conspiracy to possess a listed chemical (ephedrine)
with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(d)(1), held not to qualify as a "drug-trafficking
offense" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, for purposes of imposing
a sentence enhancement to an illegal re-entry sentence, because
the U.S.