United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d
691 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 1997) (Texas felony conviction for possession
of marijuana, in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code
§ 481.121, was "aggravated felony" as defined by
INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) requiring 16-level
increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry
conviction), superseded by statute as stated in United States
v.

Salazar-Regino v. Trominski, 415 F.3d 436
(5th Cir. June 30, 2005) (Texas deferred adjudication following
guilty plea to felony possession of marijuana constituted
a conviction for removal purposes under INA § 101(a)(48)(A),
8 U.S.C.

United States v. Sanchez,
179 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 26, 2001) (Texas felony conviction
for possession of cocaine for personal use was not an aggravated
felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (effective Nov. 1,
2001), requiring eight-level increase in offense level of
illegal re-entry conviction, since the new Guidelines in U.S.S.G.

United States v. Caicedo-Cuero, 312 F.3d
697 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2002) (Texas conviction of possession
of marijuana, in violation of Health & Safety Code § 481.121(b)(3),
which was a "state jail felony" with a maximum of
two years, constituted an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), for purposes of enhancing a sentence
for illegal re-entry under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Rivera, 265 F.3d 310 (5th
Cir. Sept. 7, 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1105 (2002) (Texas
felony conviction for possession of controlled substance qualified
as "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), for purpose of enhancing illegal
re-entry sentence).

Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33 (1st
Cir. Oct. 13, 1992) (Rhode Island conviction of possession
of a controlled substance, in violation of R.I.Gen.Laws §
21-28-4.01(C)(1)(a), was a felony under state law and would
have been a felony under federal law, because of two prior
drug convictions, and therefore constituted an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

Durant v. ICE, 393 F.3d 113, 114 n.1 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2004) (court declined to address whether two state simple possession convictions constitute an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, so this question is still open in the Second Circuit); contra, Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382, 385 (BIA 2007), citing United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (second possession conviction constitutes aggravated felony for sentencing purposes only).
Thanks to Jared Brown.

United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81 (2d
Cir. Dec. 24, 2002) (New York convictions for misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance, under New York Penal
Law § 221.10, 221.15, 221.40 (2000), constituted aggravated
felonies warranting 8-level enhancements under U.S.S.G. §
2L1.2(b) of defendants sentence for illegal re-entry).

United States v. Saenz-Mendoza,
287 F.3d 1011 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (Utah misdemeanor
conviction of child abuse, cruelty toward a child, constituted
an "aggravated felony" as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentence enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), for illegal re-entry).

Matter of Sweetser, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 709 (BIA May 19, 1999) (Colorado conviction
of criminally negligent child abuse under sections 18-6-401(1)
and (7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, where negligence
in leaving stepson alone in a bathtub resulted in the childs
death, was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.