Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Arizona conviction in 2003 of class 2 misdemeanor domestic violence/assault, in violation of A.R.S. 13-1203(A), 13-3601, does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude, because the additional element of the domestic relationship is insufficient to convert a non-CMT simple assault conviction into a crime of moral turpitude).

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. October 26, 2006)(en banc) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats. 13-1203(A)(1), 13-601 ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Arizona court order imposing a twelve-month sentence, for Arizona misdemeanor conviction of "theft by control of property with a value of $250 or more," in violation of A.R.S. 1301802(A)(1), (C), arguably would not constitute a one-year sentence imposed for removal purposes since the state at the time of sentence designated the conviction a misdemeanor, and under Arizona law the maximum term of imprisonment for a misdemeanor was then six months, see A.R.S.

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) ("With regard to the crime of assault, courts generally have held that a conviction for simple assault does not involve moral turpitude."), citing Reyes-Morales v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 937, 945 n.6 (8th Cir. 2006) (simple assault does not involve moral turpitude); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2004); United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1933).

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Arizona conviction in 2003 of class 2 misdemeanor domestic violence/assault, in violation of A.R.S. 13-1203(A), 13-3601, does not constitute a crime of moral turpitude, because the offense can be committed by "threats that cause no injury at all"), distinguishing Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1993) (California conviction of corporal injury of spouse, in violation of Penal Code 273.5(a), constituted crime of moral turpitude, because the statute required intent to cause harm).

United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Utah conviction of second-degree attempted aggravated burglary, under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203, does not necessarily constitute a "crime of violence" illegal reentry sentencing purposes since Utah conviction of attempted aggravated burglary does not require an entry into a dwelling). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0510475p.pdf

United States v. Reina-Rodriguez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Utah conviction of second-degree attempted aggravated burglary, under Utah Code Ann. 76-6-203, does not necessarily constitute a "crime of violence" illegal reentry sentencing purposes, because Utah conviction of attempted aggravated burglary may be committed by merely possessing a dangerous weapon while committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and such possession does not involve the use or threat of force), following United States v. Serna, 435 F.3d 1046, 1047 (9th Cir.

United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (although language of Arizona burglary statute met generic definition of burglary for federal career criminal act sentence enhancement purposes, Arizona judicial decisions had expanded the definition to include a conviction in which the intent to commit the crime had been formed after entry of the structure, so the Arizona offense could be committed by shoplifting in a building, which does not satisfy the Taylor generic definition of burglary offense).

Joseph v. United States Atty Gen., 465 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2006) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3) and 924(a)(1)(D) [transporting firearm across state lines] is not an aggravated felony firearms trafficking offense under INA 101(a)(43)(C) for immigration purposes because the statute does not at a minimum require "trafficking" in firearms; the offense may be committed by bringing ones own firearm across state lines).

United States v. Villegas-Hernandez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3072558 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2006) (Texas conviction for violation of Penal Code 22.01(a), assault, is not an aggravated felony crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes since the statute may be violated without the perpetrator using force against the victim).
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