The Ninth Circuit appears to be internally split on whether a charging document phrased in the conjunctive constitutes an admission of all the facts in the charge (i.e., a plea to a "permanent and temporary" taking necessary admits a permanent taking), or whether a plea to such language should be read in the disjunctive where the statute of conviction is disjunctive and the conjunctive charge is merely a device that allows the prosecution to prove either of the disjunctive options in the statute in order to convict (i.e., a plea to a "permanent and temporary" taking really means a plea to "per

Rosenberg, Benefit Of The Doubt: The Survival Of The Principle Of Narrow Construction And Its Current Applications, 8 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1553 (2003).

Immigration Reduces Crime Rates
LiveScience.com Tue Mar 18, 4:11 PM ET
Contrary to popular stereotypes, areas undergoing immigration are associated with lower violence, not spiraling crime, according to a new study by Harvard University sociologist Robert Sampson, published in the American Sociological Association's Contexts magazine. He examined crime and
immigration in Chicago and around the United States to find the truth behind the popular perception that increasing immigration leads to crime.

Burgess v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___ (Apr. 16, 2008) ("Burgess urges us to apply the rule of lenity in determining whether the term "felony drug offense" incorporates [21 U.S.C.] 802(13)'s definition of "felony." "[T]he touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity." Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed," Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct.

Piedrahita v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 142 (1st Cir. Apr. 28, 2008) (petition for review denied where petitioner failed to raise relevant issues in his opening brief, and addressed a dispositive issue in an incoherent and perfunctory manner).

Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2008) (noncitizen failed to establish a reasonable probability that the state would apply the statute of conviction outside the definition of the ground of deportation in the aiding and abetting an assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated felony crime of violence context, since he presented no evidence that California has applied aiding and abetting assault outside the generic definition of a crime of violence).

United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 523 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. Apr.

United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 523 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2008) ("In another recent en banc decision of our court, the defendant Vidal did not plead guilty "as charged." United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007). As a result, our en banc court had "no way of knowing what conduct Vidal admitted when he pled guilty to conduct that was not identical to that charged in Count One of the Complaint." Id. at 1088.

Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2008) (application of the stop-time rule under INA 240A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B), as applied to a conviction occurring before IIRAIRA effective date was not impermissibly retroactive).

Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) ("[A] conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) for filing a false tax return constitutes an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M) if that offense involved a loss of $10,000 or more. ... The PSR could be considered under the circumstances presented here, particularly given that Arguelles-Olivares admitted in the underlying criminal proceedings that the amounts of loss reflected in the PSR were correct.").