A new AILF Practice Advisory entitled "The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: FOIA and Petitions for Review" is now available. This practice advisory examines how DHS invokes the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to deny FOIA requests and how courts apply the doctrine to dismiss petitions for review. The advisory provides arguments to challenge the doctrine in both contexts. Access this resource on the AILF website at http://www.ailf.org/lac/pa/lac_pa_fugdis.pdf.

http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/ICE_FOIA.pdf

Flores-Juarez v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. Jun. 26, 2008) (the bar to non-LPR cancellation of removal for noncitizens who fall within certain criminal grounds of removal, under INA 240A(b)(C), applies regardless of the date of the conviction; the 10-year Good Moral Character requirement under INA 240A(b)(B) does not also impose a 10 year limit on the period in which the criminal convictions must have occurred).

Matter of ASB, 24 I. & N, Dec. 493 (BIA 2008) (Board of Immigration Appeals should defer to the factual findings of an Immigration Judge, unless they are clearly erroneous; BIA retains independent judgment and discretion, subject to applicable governing standards, regarding pure questions of law and the application of a particular standard of law to those facts).

Matter of VK, 24 I. & N. Dec. 500 (BIA 2008) (the BIA reviews de novo an IJs finding regarding the likelihood that a noncitizen will be tortured, since that finding relates to whether the statutory requirement for establishing eligibility for relief from removal has been met and is therefore a mixed question of law and fact).

Ochieng v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 1110, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2008) (the definition of "child abuse" under INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), set forth in dictum in a precedent BIA decision, was entitled to deference because it was based on a permissible construction of the statute), applying Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); accord Loeza-Dominguez v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 1156 (8th Cir. 2005); but cf. Velasquez-Herrera v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir.

Xian Tuan Ye v. Dept of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 296-97 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Ye challenges the IJs denial of CAT relief, having failed to do so before the BIA. While ordinarily, under 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), an alien may not raise before this Court an issue or category of relief not raised before the BIA, see Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005); Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2004), the BIA addressed Yes CAT claim despite this oversight. Accordingly, Yes failure to raise the CAT claim himself is excused, and we have jurisdiction to address it now. See Waldron v.

Ann Benson, Directing Attorney, Washington Defender Associations Immigration Project, Overview of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conduct for Immigrant Survivors of Domestic Violence (Sept. 2004)
http://www.immigrationadvocates.org/library/item.181220-Overview_of_Immi...

Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 595 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1979) (the underlying purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is as follows: "[The exhaustion requirement] "makes sense in terms of both judicial economy and agency efficiency", State of California ex rel. Christensen v. FTC, 549 F.2d at 1324, because it permits "an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies". Parisi v. United States, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.

Attorney General Opinion, Opinions from Office of Legal Counsel, Vol. 31, May 17, 2007 ("A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) is
limited to those offenses of which the use or attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon is an element that is, a factual predicate specified by law and required to support a conviction.