Federal conviction of misprision of a felony, under 18 U.S.C. 4, does not constitute an aggravated felony, or a crime of moral turpitude, at least within the Ninth Circuit. This offense is not considered a drug-trafficking aggravated felony, even if the principals felony was a drug-trafficking offense and the client were to receive a sentence of one year or more. See Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I & N Dec. 889 (BIA 1999), distinguishing, but not overruling Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec.

Lee v. Lynch, __ F.3d __ (10th Cir. Jul. 1, 2015) (section 242B(2) of the INA is not a jurisdictional statute; where noncitizen was detained in Tenth Circuit, but appeared telephonically in the Fifth Circuit, then appeared in the Fifth Circuit final hearing, the Fifth Circuit was the proper venue for appeal from BIA decision).

There is a decent argument that because some deportability and inadmissibility grounds specify jurisdictions, e.g., "state and federal and foreign" (controlled substance and aggravated felony grounds) or "state, federal, local and Indian" (domestic violence ground), that since "local" is included in at least one ground and not included in others, local ordinances would only give rise to deportability if the ground specifically says "local." See N. Tooby & J. Rollin, Criminal Defense of Immigrants 7.26 (2012).

The Ninth Circuit held that because a lesser included charge must be one that is necessarily included in the charged offense, the lesser-included possession offense must have been possession of the same substance charged in the dismissed count charging the greater offense.

Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2146726 (9th Cir. May 8, 2015)
(California conviction of sexual battery, in violation of Penal Code 243.4(a), constituted a violent or dangerous crime, for purposes of triggering application of the Matter or Jean enhanced hardship standard to an application for a waiver of moral turpitude inadmissibility under INA 212(h)).

The Supreme Court commented, in dictum, that a residential burglary conviction, with a one-year sentence imposed, would qualify as an aggravated felony crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b). It stated: The classic example is burglary. A burglary would be covered under 16(b) not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004).

Matter of Agour, 26 I&N Dec. 566 (BIA 2015) (adjustment of status constitutes an "admission" for purposes of determining an aliens eligibility to apply for a visa-fraud waiver under INA 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H) (2012)); distinguishing Matter of Connelly, 19 I&N Dec. 156 (BIA 1984).

Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015) (an Immigration Judges predictive findings of what may or may not occur in the future are findings of fact, which are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review); overruling Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 2008); Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008).

Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563 (BIA 2015) (noncitizen who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction); withdrawing Matter of E.W. Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2012), and Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010).

Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2365838 (2d Cir. May 19, 2015) (notice to appear triggered the stop-time rule, under INA 240A(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(A), for the continuous residence requirement for cancellation of removal, even though it omitted the date and time of the initial removal hearing).