Under Johnson, the Term Crime Involving Moral Turpitude
Is Void for Vagueness.

Several months ago, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because the reasons that led the Supreme Court to strike down that provision are just as present"if not more so"in the CIMT statute, the Court must apply Johnson to find that INA [ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)/ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)] is also void for vagueness.

Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2015) (California conviction of possession of child pornography, Penal Code 311.11(a), is not a divisible statute, since the jury is not required to find the exact nature of the sexual activity portrayed, so no resort may be had to the modified categorical analysis to determine whether the conviction qualified as a child pornography aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(I)).

Matter of Castrejon-Colino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 667 (BIA 2015) (where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the aliens continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.

De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2015) (a ruling from the BIA which interprets an ambiguous statute, and which overrules prior circuit court precedent under Brand X, should be presumed to act prospectively only).

Mocoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2015) (respondent did not continue to accrue continuous physical presence, for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal, after being served with a notice to appear in removal proceedings that did not contain the date and time of appearance); see Matter of Camarrillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (BIA 2011).

Ruiz-Vidal v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2015) (immigration court could look to originally charged count to identify controlled substance where noncitizen pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense; Ruiz"Vidal's plea"which references a specific count in the Information"and the Information, which references a specific controlled substance, provide clear and convincing evidence that Ruiz"Vidal was convicted of a removable offense.).

NOTE: This case does not necessarily apply to all pleas to lesser included offenses.

Peralta Sauceda v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. Oct. 14, 2015) (noncitizen had burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish he had not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence, even though Maine courts do not maintain records sufficient to show whether he was convicted under the bodily injury prong of the Maine statute, rather than the general assault prong, which does not involve sufficient violence).

NOTE: This case has been reversed on rehearing by Peralta Sauceda v. Lynch, __ F.3d __ (1st Cir. Apr.

This practice advisory and a link discuss state by state post-conviction relief statutes. http://www.adminrelief.org/resources/item.566101-Post_Conviction_Relief_...
They are also on the www.adminrelief.org website.

Pina-Galindo v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 2015) (per curiam) (non-LPR cancellation criminal bar includes inadmissibility INA 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) [multiple convictions with sentences totaling five years or more]).

Pena v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 2015) (Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider alien's petition for review of expedited removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), 1252(a)(2)(D), (e)).