Practice Advisory on Arizona TASC and similar programs: State no-plea diversion programs in which a defendants confession is not placed in the court file do not constitute convictions for immigration purposes under the statutory definition of conviction. INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A). The admission of facts referred to in this statute must mean an admission to the court, rather than to the prosecutor.

Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37, 38-39 (BIA Oct. 23, 2012) (Arizona convictions of possession of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Statute 13-3405(A)(1), and possession of drug paraphernalia (the plastic bag in which the marijuana was contained), Ariz. Rev. Statute 13-3415(A), constituted a single offense involving a small quantity of marijuana, under INA 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 2012) (the time at which the DHS must determine whether a LPR is an applicant for admission because he or she falls under INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(13)(C)(v), is generally at the earliest opportunity, before the initiation of removal proceedings; the DHS may delay this determination when paroling a noncitizen to face prosecution until after the prosecution has been resolved).
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol26/3773.pdf

Mendoza Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2012) (the LPR aggravated felony bar to relief under INA 212(h) does not apply to a noncitizen who adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent resident status while remaining within the United States); see Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012).

Carranza-De Salinas v. Holder, 700 F.3d 768, *772 (5th Cir. Nov. 6, 2012) (noncitizen convicted by jury trial of an aggravated felony prior to the repeal of former INA 212(c) is eligible to apply for the relief under St. Cyr., even though she was found guilty by a jury; [I]n light of Vartelas, Carranza may invoke the presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. Because she has demonstrated the kind of reliance described by the Court in Vartelas, namely a likelihood of reliance on prior law, see 132 S.Ct.

Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (Texas conviction of assault, in violation of Penal Code 22.01(a)(1), properly held a crime involving moral turpitude, where there was a heightened mens rea, the use of a weapon, and violent conduct, applying the modified categorical analysis).

Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821, *823, 2012 WL 4937384 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (To rise to the level of a CIMT, the BIA has held that an assault statute must have at least two characteristics. First, the scienter element must require specific intent, or, put another way, the actus reus must be accompanied by the evil intent, depraved or vicious motive, or corrupt mind associated with moral turpitude. Id. at 241. Second, the assault statute must require a meaningful level of harm, which must be more than mere offensive touching. Id. at 241"42.

Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (Texas conviction of assault, in violation of Tex. Penal Code 22.01(a)(1), where the record shows intentional mens rea, is a crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes), following Matter of Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241"42 (BIA 2007).

Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, *982 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012)(en banc) (In Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, the Supreme Court imposed evidentiary limitations on the types of documents that we may consider under the modified categorical approach; we may review only the charging instrument, transcript of the plea colloquy, plea agreement, and comparable judicial record of this information. Id . That holding applies here [when determining eligibility for cancellation of removal because the statute refers to generic crimes.]).

Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, *985 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012) (en banc) (We hold that federal law principles determine the effect of a guilty plea under the modified categorical approach.).