Grant v. US DHS, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2757042 (2d Cir. Jul. 17, 2008) (per curiam) (rejecting equal protection challenge to the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 1432 (a) (1994), which provided that an alien born out of wedlock could obtain derivative citizenship based on the naturalization of his or her mother before the alien turned eighteen but could not obtain derivative citizenship based on the naturalization of his or her father before the alien turned eighteen unless paternity had been established by legitimation).

Masih v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2747462 (5th Cir. Jul. 16, 2008) (IJ and BIA abused discretion by denying motion for continuance where noncitizen eligible for adjustment of status was unable to adjust only because visas had become unavailable after application; BIA and IJ failed to consider OI 245.4(a)(6) in their rulings despite the regulation's applicability; and the BIA ignored precedent set in Matter of Ho).

News article on private bills contains good explanation of the process, strategy, and chances of success. Single-family immigration bills face great difficulty in Congress, McClatchy Newspapers, Tucson, Arizona (June 15, 2008), http://www.azstarnet.com/sn/border/243832

Bustamante v. Musakey, 531 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. Jul. 9, 2008) ("We hold today, as we did twenty-two years ago in Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir.1986), that ordinarily, a consular official's decision to deny a visa to a foreigner is not subject to judicial review. However, when a U.S.

Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. Jul. 9, 2008) ("when a statute authorizes the Attorney General to make a determination, but lacks additional language specifically rendering that determination to be within his discretion . . . the decision is not one that is specified . . . to be in the discretion of the Attorney General for purposes of [8 U.S.C. ] 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).")

Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. Jul. 8, 2008) (reinstatement regulations, at 8 C.F.R. 241.8, constitute a valid interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), and does not contravene 8 U.S.C. 1229a; bar to collateral attack of prior removal order does not violate due process; petition did not qualify for and did not ask for consent to re-enter the United States, as required under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) & (ii)).

9 FAM 40 requires referral to a panel physician of an immigrant visa applicant has prior DUIS. A 2004 CIS memo states that DUIs may be the basis of finding of a mental disorder that is harmful to others. Counsel may therefore want to provide proof (to the extent possible) that the person either is no longer drinking and/or has rehabilitated to where alcohol is not a problem in creating risking behavior, such as evaluation from substance abuse center or therapist and attendance AA meetings.

The rule of lenity applies in criminal proceedings, while the "rule of narrow construction" applies in immigration proceedings. Each relates to construction of statutory provisions, and applies at different stages of the proceedings.
See Benefit of the Lori Rosenberg, Doubt: The Survival of the Principle of Narrow Construction and its Current Applications, 8 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1553 (Oct. 1, 2003).

No "admission of guilt" was required under this domestic violence no-plea diversion statute. Penal Code 1001.6(c). It was enacted by Stats. 1979, c. 913, p. 3141, 1, last amended by Stats. 1993, c. 221, 1, and repealed in 1995, repeal effective Jan. 1, 1996.