Severino v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2008) ("Congress has limited this court's power to review a final order of removal to those removal orders for which the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right. Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir.2006) ( citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1)). Because the bar is jurisdictional, the Court may consider only those issues that the petitioner has presented in substance to the BIA. Id.

Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2008) (denial of adjustment of status is affirmed where petitioner is inadmissible and no statutory basis exists to waive inadmissibility, since neither a state pardon nor an equal protection claim could overcome the fact that Congress has expressly declined to provide a waiver for an inadmissible alien convicted of a crime relating to a controlled substance: "We have not extensively addressed the dichotomy between inadmissible and deportable aliens in the context of a state pardon.

Singh v. US Attorney Gen., __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2008) (Florida conviction, in adult court, of defendant who was a juvenile at the time the offense was committed is still a "conviction" for immigration purposes, even though the defendant could not have been tried as an adult under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act), following Vieira Garcia v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 409 (1st Cir.2001); Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 922-23 (9th Cir.2007); Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2nd Cir. 2008).

Skurtu v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 651(8th Cir. Dec. 24, 2008) (noncitizen barred from filing "complaint" alleging IJ committed errors and violated due process rights; appeal to the circuit court is the sole means of judicial review of removal proceedings; time limits for filing a petition for review are jurisdictional and mandatory; bars on judicial review do not violate suspension clause).

On December 18, 2008, the EOIR published a new regulation on voluntary departure, specifically addressing a number of issues that have been subject to litigation, including whether voluntary departure tolls upon filing a motion to reopen or appeal. 73 Fed. Reg. 76927 (Dec. 18, 2008). The regulation may be viewed here: www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=27460&linkid=187734



Among other changes, the new rule states that:

Singh v. US Attorney Gen., __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. Dec.

Chavez-Vasquez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. Dec. 8, 2008) (a procedural due-process claim could not be heard because petitioner had failed to raise it before the BIA).

Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2008), withdrawing previous opinion, 532 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. July 10, 2008) ("Because 1101(a)(43) is part of the INA, we must defer to the BIA's articulation of the generic federal definition "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue before the agency and the BIA's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. " Parrilla v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999)). . . .

Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2008) ("The very basis of the categorical approach is that the sole ground for determining whether an immigrant was convicted of an aggravated felony is the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute. Dalton, 257 F.3d at 204. This does not require Martinez to prove how little marihuana he had or the nature of the transfer, so long as his conviction could have been based on a nonremunerative transfer of a small amount of marihuana.

De Hoyos v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2008) (prior grant of cancellation for conviction following drug conviction did not preclude later use of that conviction in subsequent removal proceedings; cancellation of removal only works to avoid removal under the proceeding in which it has been granted).