Blake v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 914865 (2d Cir. March 28, 2007) (Massachusetts statute defining offense of assault on police officer and other categories of public official, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 265, section 13D, constituted divisible statute - allowing analysis of specific offense of assault on police officer, as distinguished from assault on other possible victims, because "the various categories of public safety officers protected by the statute are listed sequentially, each separated by a comma, and are phrased in the disjunctive."), quoting Canada v.

Blake v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 914865 (2d Cir. March 28, 2007) (Massachusetts statute defining offense of assault on police officer and other categories of public official, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 265, section 13D, under intentional theory of assault, constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), since it has an element of use of force).

Jeune v. Attorney General, 476 F.3d 199, 2007 WL 512510 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2007) ("Moreover, this Court has indicated that we must assume that Jeune's conduct was only the minimum necessary to comport with the statute and record. Partyka v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir.2005) ("Under this categorical approach, we read the applicable statute to ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute."); Wilson v.

"Children Lack Capacity to Make False Claims or Misrepresentations, IJ Holds," 83 Interpreter Releases 775-776 (April 24, 2006).

United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107 (6th Cir. 1995) (''Alford'' plea refers to defendant who pleads guilty but maintains that he is innocent).

Jeune v. Attorney General, 476 F.3d 199, 2007 WL 512510 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2007) (Pennsylvania conviction of manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, in violation of 35 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 780-113(a)(30), does not constitute an "aggravated felony" under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), for immigration purposes, even though defendant was sentenced under state sentencing statute labelled "drug trafficking," since statute provided no more than that the defendant was convicted under the statute of the offense of conviction).

United States v. Gunera, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 456732 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007) (where the defendant was "found" in the United States more than five years following the defendants unlawful re-entry, indictment was barred by statute of limitations).

United States v. Torres-Villalobos, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 528195 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007) (Minnesota conviction for second-degree manslaughter, in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.205, was not a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16 because the offense can be committed with mere reckless intent). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/061876p.pdf

Puello v. BCIS, 418 F.Supp.2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2005) (for purposes of applying the permanent bar to good moral character for conviction of an aggravated felony, under INA 101(f), the date of conviction is the date of sentencing or the date the judgment of conviction was filed with Clerk of Court, rather than on date the guilty plea was entered).

Puello v. BCIS, 418 F.Supp.2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2005) (for purposes of applying the permanent bar to good moral character for conviction of an aggravated felony, under INA 101(f), the date of conviction is the date of sentencing or the date the judgment of conviction was filed with Clerk of Court, rather than on date the guilty plea was entered).