Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S.Ct. 2562 (June 24, 2004) (district court should have issued certificate of appealability, because reasonable jurist could have found district court's assessment of constitutional claims relating to defendant's low IQ of 67 debatable or wrong).
http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/us/000/02-10038.html

United States v. Carrasco-Mateo (1st Cir. November 23, 2004) (deportation does not automatically terminate defendants existing parole term or status for purposes of calculating criminal history score).
http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/1st/03-1553.html

Hatton v. Bonner, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2004) (amendment to Penal Code 290, requiring registration for persons convicted of violating Penal Code 220 [assault with intent to commit oral copulation], could be applied retroactively to defendant who committed offense prior to the amendment, because registration is not punishment), citing Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).

Resendiz v. Kovensky, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1501495 (9th Cir. June 27, 2005) (immigration custody does not constitute custody sufficient to grant federal habeas jurisdiction sufficient to challenge legal validity of conviction underlying deportation proceedings, after AEDPA and IIRAIRA, so a petitioner may not collaterally attack his state court conviction in a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition against the INS).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0355136p.pdf

Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. June 4, 2004) (removal of noncitizen while appeal of district court dismissal of habeas petition was pending in court of appeal did not deprive district court of habeas jurisdiction on remand, and case was not moot, but district court lacked authority to grant any relief beyond vacating defective deportation order).

Swaby v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 156 (2nd Cir. Feb. 3, 2004) (lifetime bar from reentrying the United States due to aggravated felony conviction is collateral consequences which creates live controversy).

Day v. McDonough, __ U.S. ___ (Apr. 25, 2006) (district court had the power (after giving petitioner notice and a chance to respond) to dismiss a state habeas petition for untimeliness even though the State erroneously agreed it was timely. If the waiver by the State had been deliberate, it would have been an abuse of discretion to dismiss it, but here it was just an error).

Earp v. Ornoski, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2005) (claim of ineffective assistance for failure to investigate mitigating circumstances merited evidentiary hearing).

Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2005) (petition was "second or successive" petition barred by 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b)(1), where petition raised same claims raised in earlier petition that was dismissed on state procedural default grounds (which constitutes a decision on the merits), and petitioner failed to challenge first petitions dismissal).

Morrison v. Mahoney, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 418563 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2005) (state did not waive procedural default argument by moving to dismiss first petition on statute of limitations grounds, and then waiving that defense when the case was returned to the district court after a successful appeal; procedural default doctrine "bars federal habeas when a state court declined to address a prisoners federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement." [Calderon v. United States District Court, 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.