Ilchuk v. Attorney General, 434
F.3d 618 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2006) (Pennsylvania conviction
of theft of services, in violation of 18 Penn. Consol. Stats.
Ann.

United States v. Wenner, 351
F.3d 969 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003) (Washington conviction of
residential burglary, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.025(1),
is not a "burglary of a dwelling" crime of violence
as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), since the statute classifies
railway cars, fenced areas, and cargo containers as dwellings
although they are not structures under Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S.

United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. Aug.
12, 2002) (California conviction of second-degree burglary,
in violation of California Penal Code § 459, was an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G),
for purposes of imposition of a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Sandoval-Venegas, 292
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. June 14, 2002) (California conviction
of violating Penal Code § 459 (burglary) not a crime of violence
for purposes of federal career criminal enhancement of bank
robbery sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 4B1.2(a), where
record of conviction did not establish that burglary was of
a dwelling).

Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. June
9, 2000) (California conviction of vehicle burglary in violation
of California Penal Code § 459 did not constitute "burglary"
within the federal aggravated felony definition, INA § 101(a)(43)(G),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), nor "crime of violence"
within INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
immigration purposes).

United States v. Parker, 5 F.3d 1322, 1325
(9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1993) (California Information charging
burglary did not satisfy Taylor because of failure to allege
"unlawful or unprivileged" entry).

United States v. Cornelio-Pena,
435 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. Jan. 30, 2006) (Arizona conviction
of solicitation to commit second-degree burglary of a dwelling,
in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1002, 1507, is a crime
of violence under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 312 F.3d
1167 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2002) (conviction of burglary of a
dwelling constitutes a crime of violence, and thus an aggravated
felony conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F),
for purposes of 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2.L1.2, comment n. 1(B)(ii)(II) (2001)).

United States v. Frias-Trujillo, 9 F.3d
875 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 1993) (Texas burglary conviction was
a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and
thus an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentencing enhancement under
§ 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry conviction).

United States v. Fuentes-Rivera,
323 F.3d 869 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2003) (California conviction
for burglary of an inhabited dwelling under Penal Code §
459, 460(a), was a "crime of violence," for purposes
of a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.