Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.
Sept. 21, 2004) (federal conviction of conspiracy to utter
and possess counterfeit securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, 513(a), constitutes an aggravated felony, as "an
offense relating to . . . counterfeiting," under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(R), (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R), (U), triggering
deportability under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.

Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d
93 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2001) (federal conviction for conspiracy
to export firearms without license, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 and 22 U.S.C. 2778, constitutes an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(C), (U), 8 U.S.C.

Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 204 F.Supp.2d 405,
406 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2002) (federal convictions of conspiracy
to impede the IRS in collection of income and payroll taxes
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, failure to collect or pay
income/FICA taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202, and attempt
to evade or defeat tax in violation of 26 U.S.C.

United States v. Ogembe, 41 F.Supp.2d 567 (E.D.Pa.
Mar. 3, 1999) (federal conviction of conspiracy to commit
bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 constitutes an
aggravated felony as an offense that "involves fraud
or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000" under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), (U), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), (U), regardless of sentence).

Matter of Espinoza, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 889 (BIA June 11, 1999) (en banc) (federal conviction
for misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4 does not constitute
a conviction for an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), as an offense relating to obstruction
of justice), distinguishing Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21
I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA July 15, 1997)).

Matter of Joseph,
22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 808 (BIA May 28, 1999) ("[I]t
is substantially unlikely that the offense of simply obstructing
or hindering ones own arrest will be viewed as an obstruction
of justice aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) of the Act for removal purposes.").

Matter of Batista-Hernandez,
21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA July 15, 1997) (federal conviction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 as accessory after the fact to a
drug-trafficking crime establishes deportability as an aggravated
felony under former INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), because the offense
of accessory after the fact falls within the definition of
an obstruction of justice crime under INA § 101(a)(43)(S),
8 U.S.C.

Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. May 1,
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1069 (2001) (Texas conviction
of burglary of vehicle with intent to commit theft, in violation
of Tex. Penal Code § 30.04(a), with suspended sentence of
four years imprisonment, was not a burglary offense under
INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) sufficient
to render noncitizen deportable).

United States v. Vasquez-Flores,
265 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 122
S.Ct. 1180 (2002) (Utah conviction for knowingly attempting
to receive or transfer a stolen motor vehicle, in violation
of Utah Code § 41-1a-1316 (1953), was an "aggravated
felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)
for enhancement purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) of an
illegal re-entry sentence).

Matter of Bahta, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 1381 (BIA Oct. 4, 2000) (Nevada conviction for attempted
possession of stolen property, in violation of Nevada Revised
Statutes §§ 193.330 and 205.275, is a conviction for an attempted
"theft offense (including receipt of stolen property),"
and therefore an aggravated felony, within the meaning of
INA §§ 101(a)(43)(G) and (U), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and
(U)).