United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. Aug 4, 2011) (It makes no difference that everyone understood McMurray's plea as relating to the facts alleged by the state at the plea hearing. See Savage, 542 F.3d at 967. The Court in Shepard rejected the argument that a defendant's plea necessarily rested on particular facts because those facts are the only ones in the record underlying the charges and the defendant never explicitly disputed them. See Shepard, 544 U.S.

Rosario v. Holder, 655 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2011)
(The modified categorical approach does not permit examination of the charging instrument and plea agreement for the purpose of learning the specific facts of a specific conspiracy, such as the fact that this specific conspiracy involved a prostitution business, or what the defendant's specific role was in aiding and abetting that conspiracy.).

Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (a waiver of the fraud under former INA 241(f) applies only to those inadmissible on grounds of fraud; respondent was inadmissible on grounds of a controlled substance conviction); citing Matter of Sosa"Hernandez, 20 I. & N. Dec. 758, 760"61 (BIA 1993) (a waiver under INA 241(f) waives not only deportability but also the underlying fraud, thereby validating the applicant's lawful permanent resident status and making him theoretically eligible for a 212(c) waiver).

NOTE: The courts reasoning is arguably faulty.

Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (a waiver of the fraud under former INA 241(f) applies only to those inadmissible on grounds of fraud; respondent was inadmissible on grounds of a controlled substance conviction); citing Matter of Sosa"Hernandez, 20 I. & N. Dec. 758, 760"61 (BIA 1993) (a waiver under INA 241(f) waives not only deportability but also the underlying fraud, thereby validating the applicant's lawful permanent resident status and making him theoretically eligible for a 212(c) waiver).

NOTE: The courts reasoning is arguably faulty.

Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (application for suspension of deportation under former INA 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(2), was properly denied for lack of the necessary period of continuous presence: The period of continuous physical presence ended at the time Torres"Rendon committed his drug crime in 1987, or, in the alternative, when an Order to Show Cause was issued to him in 1988.

Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2010) (immigration detainee brought civil rights action which was improperly dismissed: petitioner who has no available habeas remedy, through no lack of diligence on his part, is not barred by Heck from pursuing 1983 claim for unlawful confinement).

United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. Oct.

Cortez-Guillen v. Holder, 623 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2010) (Although the Supreme Court has explained that there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime, Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007), we cannot ... ignore the plain language of [the statute of conviction]. Cerezo, 512 F.3d at 1167.

Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir., Oct. 27, 2010) (California conviction of robbery, in violation of Penal Code 211, was a crime involving moral turpitude), deferring to Matter of G-R-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 733, 734 (BIA 1946); Matter of Kim, 17 I. & N. Dec. 144, 145 (BIA 1979)).

Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir., Oct. 27, 2010) (because Congress's intent is not clear regarding the definition of moral turpitude, we apply Chevron deference to the BIA's precedential case-by-case adjudications determining which crimes involve moral turpitude. Id. at 908-09. The BIA's interpretation is entitled to deference so long as it is a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 909 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)).).