Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971 (6th Cir. May 14, 2009) ("these claims have not been administratively exhausted because Lin did not present them in his brief for his BIA appeal. This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been administratively exhausted."), citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1); Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 559-60 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding "only claims properly presented to the BIA and considered on their merits can be reviewed by this court in an immigration appeal").

Arellano-Hernandez v. United States, 564 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. May 5, 2009) (VAWA special rule cancellation is an application for relief separate from non-LPR cancellation; VAWA application was untimely when filed after deadline for relief filed by IJ, even though non-LPR cancellation application had been timely filed).

Vargas v. Holder, 567 F.3d 387 (8th Cir. May 20, 2009) (BIA did not abuse discretion in denying motion to reopen based on fact that respondents daughter had been involved in a serious car accident where daughter was neither a USC or LPR child, and therefore was not a person for whom hardship could be shown).

United States v. Ventura, 565 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2009) (in considering whether state conviction falls within federal statutory category for criminal sentencing purposes, under the categorical analysis, the state label or name for the offense does not control), citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).

Brezilien v. Holder, 565 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. May 12, 2009) (BIA violated its own regulation when it engaged in de novo factfinding to deny claim for immigration relief, improperly reversing IJs factual finding without applying the clearly erroneous standard of review).

Matter of Guzman-Gomez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 824 (BIA May 8, 2009) (the terms "child" and "parent" defined at 8 U.S.C. 1101(c), do not encompass stepchildren and stepparents; a person born outside the United States cannot derive United States citizenship under 8 U.S.C. 1431(a), by virtue of his or her relationship to a nonadoptive stepparent).

Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. May 20, 2009) (since the statute is unambiguous, the court need not reach the second step of the Chevron analysis).

Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. May 20, 2009) (since the statute is unambiguous, the court need not reach the second step of the Chevron analysis).

Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. May 8, 2009) (BIA made legal error by overlooking and mischaracterizing medical facts relevant to determination of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for non-LPR cancellation of removal)

Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. May 8, 2009) ("Under our decision in Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006), that the REAL ID Act restores our jurisdiction to review "constitutional claims or questions of law," 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), and our decision in Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2008), that we can review the determination of whether "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is present in those rare cases where a BIA decision rests on fact-finding "which is flawed by an error of law," id. at 40")