United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. Apr. 10, 2008) (sentencing court could not rely on a charge of which the defendant was not convicted to identify the particular subdivision, within a divisible statute, of which the defendant was convicted), citing United States v. Neri-Hernandes, 504 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 2007) (reaching same conclusion when defendant pleaded guilty to attempted kidnapping but indictment charged only aggravated kidnapping); see also United States v. Turner, 349 F.3d 833, 836 (5th Cir.

United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. Apr.

Sanchez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2008) (non-LPR cancellation of removal application not barred as lacking good moral character where applicants smuggling activity qualifies under the family unity waiver under INA 212(d)(11)), following Moran v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2005).

Gutierrez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2008) (leaving the United States under voluntary departure broke continuous residence for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal).

Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir. Mar 11, 2008) (bar to 212(h) waiver for LPRs with aggravated felony convictions only applies to noncitizens who obtained LPR status upon admission to the United States; the bar does not apply to LPRs who adjusted to LPR status without leaving the United States; the court found the language of INA 212(h) was unambiguous in this regard, and so did not give Chevron deference to the BIA). This decision overrules Matter of Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec.

Rebilas v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2007) (Arizona conviction of attempted public sexual indecency to a minor, in violation of ARS 13-1001 and 13-1403(B), forbids conduct that falls outside the federal definition of attempted sexual abuse of a minor under INA 101(a)(43)(A), (U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(A) and (U): "Arizona's definition of attempt under ARS 13-1001 is broader than the federal definition of attempt. While the federal definition of attempt requires the defendant to commit an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the crime, United States v.

Rebilas v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 1161, ___1163 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2007) ("Under the Taylor categorical approach, this court must look to "the ordinary case" that is prosecuted by the state, not some extreme hypothetical. James v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1597, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). Here, there was no evidence submitted, nor cases cited, about what types of conduct are ordinarily prosecuted under ARS 13-1403(B). See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct.

Rebilas v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2007) (California conviction of attempt to commit an offense "is broader than the federal definition of attempt. While the federal definition of attempt requires the defendant to commit an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the crime, United States v. Morales-Perez, 467 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.

Matter of O'Sullivan, 10 I. & N. Dec. 320 (BIA 1963) (BIA can look behind facially valid conviction where state court wholly lacked authority to issue order).

In January 2008, there were 4,739 federal prosecutions classified as immigration matters, according to timely enforcement data from the Justice Department. This is up over 20% from the previous month, and represents the largest monthly number of such prosecutions in the past seven years. There has been substantial growth in the number of cases handled by U.S. Magistrate Courts, and some portion of this increase may reflect improvements in the recording of these magistrate cases by the Justice Department.