Matter of Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2012) (in removal proceedings arising within the jurisdictions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, an aggravated felony conviction disqualifies an alien from relief under INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (2006), only if the conviction occurred after the alien was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident following inspection at a port of entry); following in their jurisdictions only Bracamontes v. Holder, Nos. 10-2033, 10-2280, 2012 WL 1037479 (4th Cir.Mar. 29, 2012); Martinez v.

Matter of ASJ, 25 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2012) (an Immigration Judge lacks jurisdiction to review the termination of an aliens asylum status by the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 208.24(a)).

Matter of Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2012) (in removal proceedings arising outside the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, section 212(h) relief is unavailable to any alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony after acquiring lawful permanent resident status, without regard to the manner in which such status was acquired); reaffirming Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010).

Practice Advisory. This decision is wrong and should be fought.

Matter of Arrabelly and Yerrabally, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2012) (leaving and re-entering the United States under a grant of advance parole is not a departure for purposes of triggering inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(9)(B)), revised August, 16, 2012).

Adams v. Holder, 692 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2012) (the five-year limitation on rescinding an alien's adjusted status, INA 246(a), 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), does not apply to persons who obtained LPR status via consular processing: adjustment of status under the INA is properly construed as a technical term describing a process whereby certain aliens physically present in the United States may obtain permanent resident status ... without leaving the United States. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d at 13 (quoting 3B Am.Jur.2d Aliens & Citizens 2134) (omission in original).

Gjerjaj v. Holder, 691 F.3d 288 (2nd Cir. Aug. 28, 2012) (noncitizen from non-VWP country who fraudulently enters the U.S. with a false passport from a VWP country is bound by VWP restriction on removal proceedings).

Vartelas v. Holder, 689 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2012) (on remand from Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012), which implicitly required the conclusion that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) change should not be applied to petitioner retroactively, the case is remanded to the BIA to consider whether he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to argue the issue of retroactivity).

Desai v. Attorney General, 695 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2012) (the post-departure bar, under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d), which precludes a removed person from filing a motion to reopen immigration proceedings, can be invoked by the agency as a basis for refusing to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a)); distinguishing Prestol Espinal v. Attorney General, 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir.2011) (the post-departure bar held invalid to the extent it conflicted with a statute, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 2012) (for non-common law offenses, the modified categorical approach applies only when the statute defines more than one crime, so an admission at plea that the defendant used force in committing the offense is irrelevant where the statute of conviction covers only one generic crime that does not have force as an element).

United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914, *920 (9th Cir. Jul. 3, 2012) (Our precedent is clear that a district court may not rely on a PSR's factual description of a prior offense to determine whether the defendant was convicted of a crime of violence, notwithstanding the defendant's failure to object to the PSR. . . . Thus, to the extent the district court relied on the PSR's factual description of Castillo"Marin's prior offense to determine that Castillo"Marin had been convicted of a crime of violence, it plainly erred.); United States v.