Ramos v. U.S. Attorney General, 709 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013) (Here, the Government argues that, under Duenas"Alvarez, Ramos must show that Georgia would use the Georgia statute to prosecute conduct falling outside the generic definition of theft; if he cannot, the Government argues, the statute cannot be considered divisible.

Cano v. U.S. Attorney General, 709 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. Feb. 15, 2013) (Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence, in violation of Fla. Stat. 843.01 [knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any [officer] ... by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer], is a crime involving moral turpitude, because the offense requires intentionally offering or doing violence to the officers person); following United States v. Romo"Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1250 n.4 (11th Cir.

Matter of Garcia-Mendoza, unpublished (BIA Feb. 15, 2013) (A200 582 682) (actual confinement of 180 days or more constitutes a statutory bar to showing good moral character, even after state court nunc pro tunc sentence reduction of the sentence imposed to 166 days).

Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77, ___ (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (It is common ground among the parties that theft offenses can meet this definition, and that not all theft offenses do so. As noted above, the BIA generally distinguishes between turpitudinous thefts and their less depraved counterparts by asking whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of the purloined property.); citing In re Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973).

Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77, ___ n.1 (1st Cir. Feb. 1, 2013) (court declined to consider government argument not the basis of the BIA decision: In this case, however, the BIA treated the permanent-or-temporary-intent question as dispositive, and our review is limited to the reasoning articulated below. Mihaylov v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir.2004); see Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir.2007) (bypassing this issue where the BIA treated the [permanent intent] inquiry as determinative).).

Yeremin v. Holder, 707 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2013) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in identification documents in violation of 1028(a)(3), which prohibits knowingly possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents or false identification documents, constituted a crime of moral turpitude because the conduct prohibited by the statute inherently involves deceit).

Moral-Salazar v. Holder, 708 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. Feb. 28, 2013) (the jurisdictional bar of INA 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) does not allow review of the denial of a discretionary motion for continuance).

Smykiene v. Holder, 707 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2013) (Immigration Judge and the BIA erred in allowing noncitizen who claimed not to have received notice to reopen her case; BIA failed to recognize its own distinction between providing notice, and receipt of notice).

Teague is a test that governs petitions brought 28 USC 2254 or 28 USC 2255. Padilla's case was decided on an appeal from the Kentucky Supreme Court, which is not governed by these statutes. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 505 (1993). Therefore, Teague should not govern state review of state convictions at all. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 273, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008). The states, however, are free to adopt the Teague rule if they wish.

Gallimore v. Holder, 715 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. May 22, 2013) (jurisdictional bar to review where noncitizen has committed an aggravated felony bars petition to review denial of relief under the convention against torture).