Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014) (a lawful permanent resident otherwise eligible for relief under former INA 212(c) is eligible without regard to whether the conviction resulted from a plea agreement or a trial, and without regard to whether he or she was removable or deportable under the law in effect when the conviction was entered).

Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254 (BIA 2014) (an LPR with 7 years domicile in the United States who is removable due to a conviction between November 29, 1990 and April 24, 1996, is eligible for former INA 212(c) relief, inadmissible under INA 212(a)(3)(A), (B), (C), (E), or 212(a)(10)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A), (B), (C), (E), or (10)(C) (2012); or served five years jail, in aggregate because of one or more aggravated felony convictions).

Matter of J, 6 I&N Dec. 562, 569 (BIA 1955) (commutation by the President of the United States or the Governors of States ha[s] exactly the same legal effect as though the commuted sentence had been imposed by the court in the first instance and . . . after commutation, the commuted sentence is the only one in existence.).

United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (Massachusetts convictions for breaking and entering (daytime or nighttime) with intent to commit a felony, M.G.L. ch. 266, 16, 18, and assault and battery with dangerous weapon, under M.G.L. ch. 265, 15A, did not categorically constitute crimes of violence, under 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Fish, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 715785 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (James and Duenas"Alvarez grants us no license to ignore actual cases on the ground that they are not typical or do not represent the majority of convictions.).

Alvarado v. Holder, 743 F.3d 271 (1st Cir. Feb. 14, 2014) (IJ applied appropriate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for non-LPR cancellation, under INA 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D), in finding that respondents gifted childs heightened educational needs did not establish sufficient hardship to grant relief).

Bautista v. Atty Gen. of the U.S., 744 F.3d 54, 59 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (no deference due to BIA interpretation of the aggravated felony definition statute where the BIA interpretation was inconsistent with a clearly expressed congressional intent); citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).

Castillo v. Holder, 729 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2013) (New Jersey disorderly persons offense is not a conviction, as defined for immigration purposes in INA 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48); Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684 (BIA 2004), requires that a disposition must be considered an adjudication of guilt in a genuine criminal proceeding under the law of the convicting jurisdiction; under New Jersey law, a disorderly persons offense is not a crime).

Immigration crime was the most common category of federal crime for which suspects were arrested and booked by the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), the federal agency responsible for taking a criminal suspect into custody. Mark Motivans, Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics, 2010 (Dec. 2013).
Thanks to crimmigration.com.

Ceron v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2014) (en banc) (California conviction of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Penal Code 245(a)(1), might no longer constitute a crime of moral turpitude, since: Barber is no longer good law for the proposition that 245(a)(1) categorically describes a CIMT, and that G-R- is unpersuasive and not worthy of deference on the point[, and] Carr v. INS, 86 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1996), is no longer good law for its holding that CPC 245(a)(2) is not a categorical CIMT; issue remanded to the BIA); overruling Gonzales v.