United States v. Fazande, 487 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. May 18, 2007) (per curiam) (federal sentence effect of state conviction is a question of federal, not state law, holding Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738, did not require federal sentencing court to follow state law on whether it constituted a conviction to enhance a federal sentence); see United States v. Morales, 854 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1988) (the meaning of the phrase "have become final" in 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) is a question of federal law, not state law).

U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)
United States v. Fazande, 487 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. May 18, 2007) (per curiam) (Texas guilty plea resulting in imposition of deferred adjudication probation constituted a "prior conviction" for purposes of sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), rejecting claim that it did not constitute a final conviction under Texas law and the Full Faith and Credit Act; 28 U.S.C.

United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f); nor is the regulation unconstitutionally vague, as applied to respondent who set fire to own vehicle with intent to defraud insurance company).

Gonzalez-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 975 (5th Cir. May 25, 2007) ("Gonzalez's misrepresentation [putting attorney's address in a different state as his own on an immigration application] is immaterial because his address had no bearing on his receipt of immigration benefits.").

Gonzalez-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 975 (5th Cir. May 25, 2007) ("A person does not have good moral character if he "has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter." 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(6). "[T]estimony is limited to oral statements made under oath . . . [and] with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits." Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 780, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1551 (1988); see also
Beltran-Resendez v. INS, 207 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir.

United States v. Sandoval-Sandoval, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. May 23, 2007) (per curiam) (district court at sentencing properly relied on California abstract of judgment, for purpose of imposing a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in reliance on a factual finding that Defendant had been convicted earlier of "a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months," since the document unequivocally contained the information needed), distinguishing United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 367 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.

United States v. Sandoval-Sandoval, 487 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. May 23, 2007) (per curiam) (district court at sentencing properly relied on California abstract of judgment, for purpose of imposing a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) in reliance on a factual finding that Defendant had been convicted earlier of "a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months," since the document unequivocally contained the information needed), distinguishing United States v. Navidad-Marcos, 367 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.

United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f); nor is the regulation unconstitutionally vague, as applied to respondent who set fire to own vehicle with intent to defraud insurance company).

United States v. Castillo-Basa, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 570326 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2007) (doctrine of collateral estoppel, applied in the criminal double jeopardy context, prevents government from charging illegal entrant with perjury where during the initial illegal re-entry prosecution, the government could not find the taped record of the deportation hearing, but later finds the tape after acquittal; "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not only bar a second prosecution on the same charge of which a defendant has been previously acquitted (or convicted).

United States v. Almazan-Becerra, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 926486 (9th Cir. March 29, 2007) (applying categorical analysis to illegal re-entry sentencing context to determine whether conviction triggers sentence enhancement).