United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. Jun. 5, 2007) (en banc) (prior convictions are not elements of offense, and need not be pleaded or found beyond reasonable doubt by jury, to impose a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1): "The Court likewise preserved the exception for prior convictions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856, 864, 868 (2007); and, most recently, James v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1600 n. 8 (2007).").

United States v. Rendon-Duarte, 482 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. March 21, 2007) (Alaska conviction of Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of Alaska Statute 11.41.220(a)(1) ("recklessly (A) places another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument."), constituted a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)(2005) ("any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (2) ...

June, 2007 ACLU briefing on conditions of confinement in immigration detention centers. "This briefing paper explains the domestic standards for detention conditions and demonstrates the pervasive problems with conditions of confinement that immigration detainees face in jails and detention facilities across the country.

Matter of Gonzalez-Silva, 24 I.& N. Dec. 218, 220 (BIA 2007) (conviction occurring prior to the effective date of INA 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E) (2000), is not "convicted of an offense under" that section and therefore is not barred from establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal by INA 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C)(2000).).
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol24/3570.pdf

United States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. Jun. 7, 2007) (Oregon conviction of sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of Oregon Revised Statute 163.425, did not qualify as a "crime of violence," for purposes of 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), of his sentence for illegal reentry after deportation both because the state statute does not make force - be it used, attempted, or threatened - an element of the crime, and because the crime does not constitute a "forcible sex offense" within the meaning of the applicable guideline).

United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. Jun. 6, 2007) (California conviction of under Penal Code 246 (maliciously and willfully discharge firearm at inhabited building or vehicle) did not categorically constitute a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. Jun. 6, 2007) (in determining elements of offense of conviction, under categorical analysis, the court must consider judicial decisions defining the elements of the offense: "The language of section 246 does not expressly include reckless conduct, but we also consider the interpretation of statutory language in judicial opinions to determine categorical reach. See Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir.2006).").

United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. Jun. 6, 2007) (California general intent offenses, such as willfully and maliciously discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, under Penal Code 246, permit conviction for conduct showing a conscious indifference to the probable consequence that one or more projectiles will strike the target; the "conscious indifference" intent element is equivalent to recklessness.), citing Fernandez-Ruiz v.

United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. Jun. 6, 2007) (California general intent offenses, such as willfully and maliciously discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, under Penal Code 246, permit conviction for conduct showing a conscious indifference to the probable consequence that one or more projectiles will strike the target; the "conscious indifference" intent element is equivalent to recklessness.), citing Fernandez-Ruiz v.

United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537 (1st Cir. Jun. 6, 2007) (Massachusetts conviction of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, a motor vehicle, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 15A(b), constituted a crime of violence, for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the elements of the statute require the use of force against the person of another).