A pardon, however, will not nullify a deportation ground based on a controlled substances conviction, firearms conviction, domestic violence conviction or protective order violation, or any other conviction not listed in the statute. FN1: Matter of Suh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 2003) (presidential or gubernatorial pardon waives only the grounds of removal specifically set forth in INA 237(a)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C.

Entry of a plea under North Carolina v. Alford, does not alter the immigration nature of the conviction, but it might make it easier for the court and prosecution to avoid insisting on making a record of the factual basis for the plea that would expand the nature of the conviction sufficiently to trigger a ground of deportation. Since an Alford plea is entered without any factual admission of guilt, the court and prosecution may allow entry of the plea without establishing any factual basis for the plea.

Puello v. BCIS, 511 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2007) (under INA 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(8), the date of conviction is the date of sentence: "In sum, we hold that, under the plain meaning of the definition of "conviction" in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), the entry of a "formal judgment of guilt . . . by a court" occurs when judgment is entered on the docket, not when a defendant pleads guilty."); see Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 562 (3d Cir. 2002) (the date of conviction under the INA is the date of either sentencing or entry of judgment on the docket); Abimbola v.

National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982-983, 125 S.Ct. 2688 (June 27, 2005) ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion. . . .

The regulations provide that departure from the United States under an order of deportation, or while a removal order is on appeal to the BIA, shall render the immigration judges decision final and bar any motion to reopen or reconsider. 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d), 1003.4. However, many circuits have challenged the validity of these regulations. William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007) (first sentence of 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d) is ultra vires to statute); Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007); Reynoso-Cisneros v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.

American Indians born in Canada should not be deportable under any ground of deportation, if they have the required blood quantum. See INA 289, 8 U.S.C. 1359. The right of free passage comes from the Jay Treaty of 1794 Art. 3, 8 Stat. 117, with Great Britain, and the Treaty of Ghent after the War of 1812 and still safeguards the right of Canadian Indians to pass the border. The treaty right has been recognized by statute and is in the INA. This means that an American Indian born in Canada cannot be barred from crossing and recrossing the border, including for criminal convictions.

Some authority exists for allowing travel during removal proceedings. Former O.I. 235.1(k)(4); Letter, Cronin, Asst. Comm., Inspections, reported in 10 AILA Monthly Mailing 497-99 (July/Aug. 1991); Inspectors Field Manual at 13.1, 17.1; 8 C.F.R. 223.2(g).

In the absence of a conviction, a finding of guilt cannot be based on inferences of facts that the noncitizen has failed or refused to admit. Matter of GM, 7 I. & N. Dec. 40 (Att'y Gen. 1956); Matter of EN, 7 I. & N. Dec. 153 (BIA 1956).

Matter of Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. 373 (BIA 2007) (noncitizen who is unlawfully present in the United States for one year, leaves the United States, and then seeks admission within 10 years of departure, is inadmissible under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B)(i)(II), even if the departure was not made pursuant to an order of removal and was not a voluntary departure in lieu of being subject to removal proceedings or at the conclusion of removal proceedings).

Matter of Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007) (to be inadmissible under INA 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2000), a noncitizen must leave the United States after accruing an aggregate period of "unlawful presence" of more than one year and thereafter reenter, or attempt to reenter, the United States without being admitted).