United States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. May 22, 2008) (court may not look to language in charge, that defendant committed burglary "willfully and unlawfully" to determine whether the California burglary conviction fits within they Taylor generic definition of burglary where an "unlawful" entry into the building is not an element of the crime of conviction; because the California burglary statute is not divisible, there was no need to look to the record of conviction), following United States v. Ortega-Gonzaga, 490 F.3d 393 (5th Cir.2007).

United States v. Desantiago-Esquivel, 526 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. May 22, 2008) (federal alternative sentence, for conviction of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, of 36 months in prison if defendant stipulated to removal, and 99 months in prison, if she did not, was held procedurally unreasonable, since 18 U.S.C. 3551(b) does not authorize imposition of alternative sentences: " District courts imposed alternative sentences only after Blakely in the event that the Guidelines were found unconstitutional. See United States v. White, 439 F.3d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir.

United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. May 21, 2008) (because defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of an immediate threat, the district court properly prevented him from introducing any evidence on a duress defense and properly declined to instruct the jury on that defense).

United States v. Chavarria-Brito, 526 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. May 29, 2008) ("The words "relating to" make it apparent that many crimes that are not specifically listed in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R) will constitute an aggravated felony as long as they are related to the crimes listed."), citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992); Richards v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).

United States v. Chavarria-Brito, 526 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. May 29, 2008) (Iowa conviction for possession of false document required to legally enter, remain, or work in this country with intent to perpetrate fraud or with knowledge that possession was facilitating fraud, in violation of Iowa Code 715A.2(1)(d) and 715A.2(2)(a)(4), was an "offense related to forgery" aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R), for purposes of imposing an eight-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) for illegal reentry after deportation).

Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (continuous physical presence clock did not begin to run again after an administrative closure; administrative closure is not a termination proceedings; it only removes the case from the IJs calendar).

It may be possible to argue that a foreign pardon, like a foreign expungement, should be effective to eliminate a first conviction of simple possession, and similar offense, in the Ninth Circuit where state rehabilitative relief works, since the Ninth Circuit held foreign rehabilitative relief effectively eliminates a conviction for all immigration purposes. Dillingham v. Ashcroft, 267 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001).

United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2008) (foreign national who forcibly seizes control of a foreign vessel in international waters may be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. when such vessel is intercepted by federal authorities).

Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. Apr.

Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) (BIA did not abuse its discretion to consider facts in presentence report to establish loss to the victim exceeded $10,000, since reason for employing "modified categorical approach" did not fully obtain when tribunal subsequently examined, for collateral purposes, the amount of loss resulting from offense; and consideration of presentence report (PSR) in determining amount of loss was not abuse of discretion where the district court accepted the PSR into the record and the defendant did not object).