Chien v. Shumsky, __ F.3d __, 2004 WL 1418015 (9th Cir. June 25, 2004) (habeas granted where evidence supporting perjury conviction for giving misleading information regarding medical credentials found constitutionally insufficient).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0156320p.pdf

United States v. Bird, 359 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. March 3, 2004) (dismissing appeal challenging whether indictment alleges sufficient facts to state offense because challenge must await final judgment after trial; appeal does not fit within "collateral order" exception to rule that only final judgments may be appealed; appeal could not be treated as mandamus because trial court did not clearly err).

In re Fonseca, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 643 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2006) (court vacated plea, because defendant did not enter a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea because he was not apprised of a direct consequence of the plea that he was ineligible for a sentence under the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) under RCW 9.94A.660, so it remanded the case for the purpose of allowing Mr. Fonseca the opportunity to elect between plea withdrawal and specific performance).

11 Most cases hold that a courts misadvice regarding the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum sentences is not detrimental to the defendant and therefore, does not constitute a violation of Rule 11. But see, United States v. Singh, 305 F.Supp.2d 109 (U.S.D.C. 2004) (Rule 11 violated where both presiding judge and the prosecutor misinformed a noncitizen defendant facing an aggravated felony conviction that there was a "chance" that the defendant could face deportation from the United States, "when in fact it was an absolute certainty."). See also, U.S. v.

United States v. Singh, __ F.Supp.3d __ (D.C. Feb. 24, 2004) (government is not required to inform defendants of collateral immigration consequences of plea, but if prosecutor does have such conversation, the obligation arises not to mislead; plea not voluntary where defendant was confused by government about immigration consequences of taking plea).

"Conviction of a crime is a ground for denying a professional license to any professional regulated by the Business and Professions Code. Bus. & P C 475, 480(a)(1)." Peck, Effect of a Criminal Conviction on Professional Licenses, Chap. 47, in California Continuing Education of the Bar, California Criminal Law – Procedure and Practice 47.2, p. 1337 (6th ed. 2002). Conviction of a crime is a ground for suspending or revoking a license of anyone licensed by the various acts covered in the Business and Professions Code. Ibid.

In re Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2006) (district judge may not reject a guilty plea that satisfies all requirements of FRCP 11(b); but may refuse to abide by plea agreement between defendant and the government; if plea agreement is rejected, judge must allow defendant to withdraw the plea; if defendant maintains the plea the court "may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5)(C) . . . .").

United States v. Monzon, 429 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. Dec.

Zhang v. United States, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2005 WL 3086840 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28404 (E.D. N.Y. Nov. 18, 2005) (motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 on involuntary plea and ineffective counsel grounds for misadvice concerning immigration consequences not barred by failure to raise issues on direct appeal); Mandarino v. Ashcroft, 290 F. Supp.2d 253, 260-61 (D. Conn. 2002) (ignorance of deportation consequences of the defendant's sentence was "cause" for the defendant's failure to appeal the sentence); United States v. Singh, 305 F. Supp.2d 109, 111 (D.D.C.

State v. Aquino, ___ Conn. ___, 2005 Conn. App. LEXIS 226 (Conn. App. June 7, 2005) ("It is axiomatic that unless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable. . . . A plea of guilty is, in effect, a conviction, the equivalent of a guilty verdict by a jury. . . . In choosing to plead guilty, the defendant is waiving several constitutional rights, including his privilege against self- incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. . . .