Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2003) (where the IJ had wrongfully denied a continuance, incorrectly reasoning that a 212 waiver was unavailable, Drax was entitled to a habeas grant and remand).

Lory D. Rosenberg & Kenneth H. Stern, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: An Antidote for the Convicted Alien, 65 Interpreter Releases 529, 531-32 (1988).

An Immigration Judge must require a noncitizen in removal hearing to state explicitly whether s/he desires representation by counsel. 8 C.F.R. 1240.10(a)(1). Prejudice may consist in the possibility that the noncitizen, with the assistance of counsel, may be able to demonstrate eligibility for relief such as cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). See Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). Failure to do so may invalidate the resulting removal order so as to constitute a defense to illegal reentry after deportation.

Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. January 31, 2005) (petition for review granted where Immigration Judge's order denying noncitizen an evidentiary hearing on his claim of unlawful arrest is a due process violation).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0274187p.pdf

United States v. Orduno-Mireles, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 768134 (11th Cir. April 6, 2005) (vacating conviction after illegal reentry does not eliminate the conviction for purposes of illegal reentry sentence enhancement for prior conviction of an aggravated felony).

United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. June 8, 2004) (18 U.S.C. 2422(b), using internet to solicit sexual activity from minor, held not facially unconstitutional as overbroad, vague, or violative of First or Tenth Amendments, for incorporating state criminal sex offense statutes).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0310001p.pdf

Cazarez-Gutierrez v Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2004), decision withdrawn presumably on jurisdictional grounds (9th Cir. April 26, 2004).      In Cazarez-Gutierrez, the Ninth Circuit held that a state felony simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony in immigration proceedings, unless it was a conviction of possession of flunitrazepam (a date-rape drug) or more than five grams of crack cocaine, which are aggravated felony convictions under federal law.

The BIA has held in two recent non-precedent decisions that actual expungement of a first-offense conviction of possession of a controlled substances is not required, before removal proceedings will be terminated, because Lujan and Manrique suggest that a conviction does not constitute a deportable controlled substances conviction if the respondent would have been eligible for treatment under the Federal First Offender Act if prosecuted in federal court, even if a state expungement has not yet actually been obtained and the defendant remains on probation.

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (June 24, 2004) (clarifying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) rule that any factual sentence enhancement that increases potential punishment over statutory maximum constitutes an element of the offense and must be found true by the jury; relevant "statutory maximum" is not maximum sentence judge may impose after finding additional facts, but maximum judge may impose without any additional findings).

United States v. Garcia-Echavarria, 374 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. July 1, 2004) (request to begin belated appeal does not affect finality of a conviction).