Matter of Gonzalez-Muro, 24 I. & N. Dec. 472 (BIA 2008) (denaturalized noncitizen who committed crimes while a lawful permanent resident and concealed them during the naturalization application process is removable on the basis of the crimes, even though the alien was a naturalized citizen at the time of conviction), distinguishing Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964)

Pinos-Gonzales v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2008) (where BIA properly applied its own discretionary exhaustion rule and refused to consider an argument not raised before the immigration judge, the circuit court will not reach the argument for the first time in a petition for review).

The Ninth Circuit ordered that Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007) be reheard en banc. In Abebe, a panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the BIAs decision in Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 2005) (finding a person convicted of sexual abuse of a minor is ineligible for a 212(c) waiver). The BIA had reasoned that the aggravated felony ground of removal had no statutory counterpart in the INA 212(a) grounds of inadmissibility, so INA 212(c) could not waive deportation on account of the conviction.

Matter of Cisneros-Gonzalez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668 (BIA 2004) (noncitizen who departs the U.S. after being served a charging document in a prior proceeding can, upon deportation and subsequent illegal re-entry, accrue another period of continuous physical presence for eligibility for non-LPR cancellation of removal).

INS. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (where the BIA has not yet considered an issue, the proper course is to remand to allow the BIA to consider the issue in the first instance).

James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2008) ("Finally, in the sentencing context, which has long informed our jurisprudence regarding aggravated felony findings under the INA, we recently remanded a case because it was unclear to what extent the District Court based its sentencing enhancement (for a "pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor") on unsubstantiated charged conduct.")

Nijhawan v. Attorney General, 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. May 2, 2008) ("In Dulal-Whiteway, the Second Circuit noted that the words of the INA provision render deportable one who has been convicted of an aggravated felony, not one who has committed an aggravated felony. Id. at 132. We do not disagree with this and, much like the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Conteh, we endorse careful consideration of the record to determine whether it is sufficiently clear that the loss connected to the crime of conviction exceeded $10,000.

United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2008) (Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not require district court to rule on defendant's objections to information contained in his PSR).

Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Before we examine that contention, we must determine the standard of review. "Ordinarily, we review de novo the classification of an offense as an aggravated felony, giving deference to the [Board's] reasonable interpretation of the INA." Sharashidze v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 566, 568 n.4 (7th Cir. 2007). However, Negrete argues that we owe the Board no deference here because this case, like Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006), turns on the interpretation of federal criminal law. We disagree.

Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Because the record here does not include any of the documents that would allow us to conduct a modified categorical analysis, we employ only the categorical approach. See United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1086 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (noting that when conducting a modified categorical analysis, the court's review is "limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge") (internal quotation marks omitted).").