Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 2001) (Delaware
conviction for forgery in violation of 11 Del.C. § 861, with
one-year sentence imposed, was "aggravated felony,"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R), causing
Court of Appeals to lose jurisdiction to consider petition
for review of deportation order).

Matter of Aldabesheh, 22 I. & N. Dec. 983 (BIA Aug. 30,
1999) (en banc) (New York conviction for forgery in the second
degree, in violation of section 170.10(2) of the New York
Penal Law, is an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(R),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R)).

Matter of Martinez-Recinos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 175 (BIA Oct.
15, 2001) (California conviction for perjury in violation
of California Penal Code § 118(a) constitutes a conviction
for an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(S) for immigration purposes).

Mathews v. Reno, 52
F.Supp.2d 195 (D.Mass. May 18, 1999) (Rhode Island conviction
of second-degree child abuse, the infliction upon a child
of any "serious physical injury," in violation of
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3(2), constitutes a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and is considered an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
immigration purposes).

United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2002) (Texas conviction of
injury to child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a),
was not "crime of violence," and so did not qualify
as an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes).

United States v. Contreras-Salas,
387 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2004) (Nevada conviction of
child abuse under Nev. Rev. Statutes § 200.508 does not qualify
as a crime of violence for purposes of enhancement of sentence
for unlawful re-entry after deportation, since statute may
be violated by negligence alone, and record of conviction
was unclear as to level of intent).

The Ninth Circuit panel's reasoning that, " [u]nder Ayala-Chavez the Attorney General has broad discretion to grant or deny [212(c)] waivers and may establish general standards governing the exercise of such discretion 'as long as these standards are rationally related to the statutory scheme.' Id. " Rivas-Gomez v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) underscores, the argument that the use of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard in adjudicating a 212(h) application is inappropriate.

Lee v. United States, 368
F.3d 218 (3d Cir. May 19, 2004) (federal conviction of filing
false income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1),
is not an aggravated felony, as defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), for immigration purposes, as
INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(ii) specifically
covers tax evasion, but INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(ii), 8 U.S.C.

Sharma v. Ashcroft,
158 F.Supp.2d 519, 521 (E.D.Pa. May 25, 2001) (federal conviction
of making false statements on a loan application, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, constitutes an "aggravated felony"
as defined by 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), for immigration
purposes).

Li v. Ashcroft,
389 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2004) (federal conviction
of making a false statement to a United States official, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, is divisible with respect to
the fraud offense aggravated felony defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i),
8 U.S.C.