Hernandez-Mancilla
v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002 (7th Cir. Apr. 11, 2001) (Illinois conviction
for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of
625 ILCS § 5/4-103(a)(1) a "theft offense," under
INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), and therefore
constituted an "aggravated felony" rendering noncitizen
deportable).

United States v. Grajeda-Ramirez,
348 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2003) (Colorado conviction
of reckless vehicular assault, in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat.
§ 18-3-205(1)(a), is a "crime of violence" for the
purposes of the U.S.S.G.).

Penuliar v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2005) (California conviction
of unlawful driving or taking a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle
Code § 10851(a), was not a theft offense, within the meaning
of INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.

Nevarez-Martinez
v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction
of controlling anothers means of transportation, knowing
or with reason to believe it had been stolen, in violation
of Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1814(A)(5), did not constitute
a theft offense aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G),
8 U.S.C.

Nevarez-Martinez v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.
Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction of failure to return lost
means of transportation, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute
§ 13-1814(A)(4), did not constitute a theft offense aggravated
felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G),
since the statute did not require intent to deprive the owner
of the property) (alternative holding).

Nevarez-Martinez
v. INS, 326 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (Arizona conviction
of unauthorized use of a means of transportation, in violation
of Arizona Revised Statute § 13-1814(A)(2), did not constitute
a theft offense aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), since the statute did not require
intent to deprive the owner of the property) (alternative
holding).

Matter of Olivares-Martinez,
23 I. & N. Dec. 148 (BIA July 3, 2001) (under United States
v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001) and United
States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. May 11,
2001), a Texas conviction for felony DWI is not a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1994), and is therefore
not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

Matter of Puente-Salazar,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1006 (BIA Sept. 29, 1999) (Texas conviction
of driving while intoxicated under Texas Penal Code § 49.04,
which is a felony as a result of a sentence enhancement statute,
is a conviction for a crime of violence and therefore an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F)),
overruled by Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336 (BIA
Apr. 4, 2002).

Matter of Magallanes-Garcia,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA Mar. 19, 1998) (conviction of aggravated
driving while under the influence, with a two and a half year
sentence, was a "crime of violence" and therefore
an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), triggering deportation under 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii)), overruled by Matter of Ramos,
23 I. & N. Dec.

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez,
388 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004) (Texas conviction under
Penal Code § 31.07(a), unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,
is not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing
purposes since the statute does not require the use of force
as an element).