United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f)).

United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f); nor is the regulation unconstitutionally vague, as applied to respondent who set fire to own vehicle with intent to defraud insurance company).

United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f)).

United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f)).

United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007) (8 C.F.R. 316.10(b)(3)(iii), barring good moral character based on commission of "unlawful acts that adversely reflect upon the applicants moral character, or was convicted or imprisoned for such acts" is not ultra vires to INA 101(f); nor is the regulation unconstitutionally vague, as applied to respondent who set fire to own vehicle with intent to defraud insurance company).

Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), vacating Matter of Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 2005).(under the equal protection principle enunciated in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976), each petitioner's eligibility for a waiver of deportability under INA 212(c) must turn on whether a similarly situated lawful permanent resident in exclusion proceedings would be given similar treatment).

"DHS regulations specifically provide that the respondent has such a burden only "[i]f the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply." 8 C.F.R. 1240.8(d) (emphasis added). Thus, in a case where deportability is not at issue but eligibility for relief is, the regulations clarify that there must first be evidence that indicates that the offense may be an aggravated felony before the burden shifts to the respondent seeking cancellation of removal to establish that his or her offense is not an aggravated felony.

Matter of Garcia, 24 I&N Dec. 179 (BIA 2007) (applicant for special rule cancellation may continue to accrue physical presence until the issuance of a final administrative decision), following Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793 (BIA 2005). Cuadra v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2005), which holds to the contrary will be followed in that the eighth circuit only.

Feliz v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. May 25, 2007) (while the court had jurisdiction over petitioner's continuance claim, the petitioner failed to ask for or otherwise indicate clearly to the immigration judge that he sought a continuance).

United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. May 23, 2007) ("one basis upon which a panel of this court can overrule a prior panel decision is if compelled "by controlling Supreme Court precedent". See Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir.2001) (quotation and citation omitted).").