Ramirez-Barajas v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Ramirez-Barajas v. Whitaker, 139 S. Ct. 584, 202 L. Ed. 2d 402 (2018) (Minnesota conviction for domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.2242(1)(1), is a crime of domestic violence for immigration purposes, even though the statute would include harm by poisoning).

Marinelarena v. Sessions, 869 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2017) (Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), holding that a noncitizen cannot meet burden of demonstrating eligibility for cancellation of removal by establishing an inconclusive record, is not irreconcilable with Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 1678 (2013), or Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), and so remains good law), will be re-heard en banc. The prior decision shall not be cited as precedent.

United States v. Werle, 877 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017) (Washington conviction of felony harassment, in violation of R.C.W. 9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii) [knowingly threaten to kill], is a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, even if the threat could be for an indeterminate time in the future and even if it may include a threat to use poison).

Ramirez-Barajas v. Sessions, 877 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Ramirez-Barajas v. Whitaker, 139 S. Ct. 584, 202 L. Ed. 2d 402 (2018) (Minnesota conviction for domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. 609.2242(1)(1), is a crime of domestic violence for immigration purposes, even though the statute would include harm by poisoning).

Marinelarena v. Sessions, 869 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2017) (Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), holding that a noncitizen cannot meet burden of demonstrating eligibility for cancellation of removal by establishing an inconclusive record, is not irreconcilable with Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 1678 (2013), or Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), and so remains good law), will be re-heard en banc. The prior decision shall not be cited as precedent.

Matter of Jasso Arangure, 27 I&N Dec. 178 (BIA 2017) (Michigan conviction of home invasion, in violation of M.C.L. 750.110a(2) is a categorical burglary offense for immigration purposes, since the intent to commit the crime need not be at entry, but may also be while remaining or upon exiting, under both the Michigan and generic federal definitions of burglary), following United States v. Quarles, 850 F.3d 836, 840 (6th Cir. 2017).

Matter of Jasso Arangure, 27 I&N Dec. 178 (BIA 2017) (res judicata does not apply to removal proceedings involving the same respondent in the same immigration status, the same conviction, and the same underlying facts, as long as ICE has charged the noncitizen under a different aggravated felony category than the aggravated felony category charged in the initial proceedings; because the legal theory is different, the operative facts are also different; Congresss intent to deport aggravated felons overcomes any reasoning behind the concept of res judicata), disagreeing with Bravo-Pedroza v.

United States v. Werle, 877 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2017) (Washington conviction of felony harassment, in violation of R.C.W. 9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii) [knowingly threaten to kill], is a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, even if the threat could be for an indeterminate time in the future and even if it may include a threat to use poison).

Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 2017)(assumed moral turpitude conviction disqualified respondent from eligibility for discretionary cancellation of removal, and qualifying for the petty offense exception to moral turpitude inadmissibility would not change this result); following In re Cortez Canales, 25 I&N Dec. 301, 303-04 (BIA 2010); see also Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2015); Hernandez v. Holder, 783 F.3d 189, 191-96 (4th Cir. 2015).

Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017) (neither the INA nor the regulations explicitly limit powers of Immigration Judges to conduct only actions the Attorney General has specifically delegated; Immigration Judges may exercise all the Attorney Generals powers over immigration, including granting a temporary waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(d)(3) to allow a noncitizen to pursue a U-Visa), reaffirming L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022
(7th Cir. 2014), and overruling Matter of Khan, 26 I. & N. Dec. 797 (2016).