As of March, 2008, 28 states have adopted court rules or statutes that require the court, at plea, to advise the defendant concerning possible immigration consequences. Alas.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(C); Arizona Rules of Court, rule 17.2(f) (2004); Ark. Rules of Court, rule 17.2(f)(2004); Cal. Penal Code 1016.5 (West 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 54-1j (West 1994); D.C. Code Ann. 16-713 (West 1994); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(8) (West 1995); Ga. Code Ann. 17-7-93 (1997); Haw. Hawaii Stat. Ann. 802E(1), (2), (3) (West 1994); Id. Crim. Rule. 11(d)(1); Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/113-8 (2006); Iowa R. Crim.

As of March, 2008, 28 states have adopted court rules or statutes that require the court, at plea, to advise the defendant concerning possible immigration consequences. Alas.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(C); Arizona Rules of Court, rule 17.2(f) (2004); Ark. Rules of Court, rule 17.2(f)(2004); Cal. Penal Code 1016.5 (West 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 54-1j (West 1994); D.C. Code Ann. 16-713 (West 1994); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(8) (West 1995); Ga. Code Ann. 17-7-93 (1997); Haw. Hawaii Stat. Ann. 802E(1), (2), (3) (West 1994); Id. Crim. Rule. 11(d)(1); Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/113-8 (2006); Iowa R. Crim.

Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2008) (court of appeals cites unpublished California decisions to show that forgery is in fact prosecuted on the basis of genuine documents falling within the statutory definition of the state offense); see Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 815, 822, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007); cf. United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir.

Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946, ___ (7th Cir. January 14, 2008) ("when there has been a fundamental, substantive constitutional violation, exhaustion is not required."), citing Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 536-37 (7th Cir. 2005); Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1998).

United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 512 n.2 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (the term "sexual abuse of a minor" has the same meaning in the aggravated felony context as in the illegal re-entry sentencing context).

Pinos-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. Mar. 5, 2008) (Court of Appeals would not address for first time a legal argument which noncitizen had not raised before the immigration judge, and which the BIA refused to address based on application of its waiver rule).

Pinos-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. Mar. 5, 2008) (Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider legal question whether BIA erred in failing properly to follow its own rules).

Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, ___ (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2008) ("In determining whether Martinez' prior conviction falls within the INA's definition of aggravated felony, we first accord substantial deference, if warranted, to the BIA's interpretation of the INA. Omari v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2003)). Having afforded any necessary deference, we then "review de novo whether the particular statute that the prior conviction is under falls within the relevant INA definition").

Mustanich v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2008) (rejecting argument that respondent is a United States citizen, although he did not file an application for naturalization prior to the applicable statutory deadline, because the United States is equitably estopped from denying his citizenship because the Government's own affirmative misconduct precluded a timely filing), following INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988) (citizenship cannot be conferred by estoppel where the statutory requirements for naturalization have not been met).

Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2008) (even where court is otherwise divested of jurisdiction because of aggravated felony conviction, court still has jurisdiction to review denial of deferral of removal under CAT).