United States v. Valdez-Maltos, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 766601 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation, is a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0540869cr0p.pdf

Quezada-Luna v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 508716 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2006) (Illinois conviction of aggravated discharge of a firearm, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(1), is an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes, because the offense required discharge of firearm into a building with reasonable knowledge that building was occupied, and therefore involved substantial risk of physical force against the person or property of another).

Canada v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1367367 (2d Cir. May 18, 2006) (Connecticut conviction for assault on a public safety officer, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-167c(a)(1) is a divisible statute, since assault of a police officer is a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), but assault of another peace office may not categorically qualify as a crime of violence; where plea transcript shows victim was, in fact, a police officer, the Government has met its burden of showing removability as an aggravated felon).

United States v. Fernandez-Cusco, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2006) (examining for plain error, the court found that where the complaint charges defendant under a subsection of a divisible statute that is a categorical crime of violence, but the plea colloquy does not indicate any specific subsection, it is not plain error for the illegal re-entry sentencing court to find that the defendant had pleaded guilty to the subsection charged in the complaint).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0540289cr0p.pdf

Canada v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 1367367 (2d Cir. May 18, 2006) (rejecting petitioners claim that only statutes divisible into discreet subjection may be found divisible; divisible statutes include statutes applying the disjunctive or to identify separate sets of elements punished under the same statute), citing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 163 (3d Cir.

Doe v. ICE, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2006 WL 1294440 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2006) ("Information relating to persons subject to a civil order of deportation does not automatically qualify as a crime record. The Government must show that the person "willfully" violated the statute to warrant entry as part of a criminal record. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1) (criminal penalties for "willful" failure to depart after entry of a removal order); 8 U.S.C. 1306 (criminal penalties for "willful" failure to comply with registration requirements). . . .

Francis v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 768549 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (Jamaican rap sheet contained in police report was, by itself, insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a "conviction" for immigration purposes, since the document by itself did not show adjudication of guilt; commentary to 8 C.F.R. 1003.41(d) suggests rap sheets admissible but not conclusive).

Salinas v. United States, 547 U. S. ___, 2006 WL 1059408 (Apr. 24, 2006) (per curiam) (conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance did not constitute a "controlled substance offense" for purposes of United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 4B1.1(a) (2003), since that term requires additional elements: "controlled substance offense" is defined in pertinent part, however, as "an offense under federal or state law . . . that prohibits . . .

Matter of Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749, 754 (BIA 1988) ("While the burden of proving admissibility is generally on the applicant in exclusion proceedings, see section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361 (1982), where an applicant for admission has a colorable claim to returning resident status, the burden is on the Service to show that the applicant should be deprived of his or her status as a lawful permanent resident. Matter of Salazar, 17 I & N Dec. 167 (BIA 1979); Matter of Kane, [15 I & N Dec 258 (BIA 1975)]").

Where LPR who is not deportable briefly leaves the United States, it would arguably violate Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection to consider him or her an arriving alien, and thus inadmissible, and the court must seek a construction of INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v) which avoids these constitutional problems. Note that INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v) contains no exceptions for people granted waivers under INA 212(c), 212(i), or former suspension of deportation under 244.