Ramtulla v. Ashcroft,
301 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2002) (Virginia conviction
of concealment of merchandise, in violation of Va.Code Ann.
§ 18.2-103, constitutes a "theft offense" and with
a two-year suspended sentence therefore constitutes an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)
for deportation purposes).
Omari v. Gonzales, 419
F.3d 303 (5th Cir. July 25, 2005) (federal conviction of interstate
transportation of stolen, converted, and fraudulently obtained
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, is not an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i) for immigration purposes,
as not all parts of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 necessarily involve fraud
or deceit).
United States v. Vasquez-Flores,
265 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001), cert. denied, 122
S.Ct. 1180 (2002) (Utah conviction for attempting to knowingly
receive or transfer a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-1a-1316, was an "aggravated felony"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for enhancement
purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) of an illegal re-entry
sentence).
Vieira-Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409 (1st
Cir. Feb. 21, 2001) (Rhode Island conviction of attempted
theft and sentence to term of ten years imprisonment constituted
an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(G), triggering deportation).
Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173 (2d Cir.
Aug. 5, 2004) (Connecticut conviction of third-degree larceny,
under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-124, constitutes an aggravated
felony theft offense under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(43)(G)).
United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148
(2d Cir. Aug. 29, 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904 (2001)
(Rhode Island misdemeanor petty theft conviction, for which
suspended sentence of one year was imposed, constituted an
aggravated felony, under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G),
warranting 16-level enhancement of illegal re-entry sentence).
Jaafar v. INS, 77 F.Supp.2d 360 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 12, 1999) (New York petit larceny conviction, in violation
of N.Y. Penal L. § 155.25, a class A misdemeanor with a sentence
to one year of imprisonment, was an "aggravated felony"
under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) for removal
purposes).
Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. May 7, 2004) (Pennsylvania conviction of theft
by deception, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3922(a),
with an indeterminate sentence from a minimum of six months
to a maximum of 23 months, does not trigger removal as an
aggravated felony fraud conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i),
8 U.S.C.
United States v. Wenner, 351
F.3d 969 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2003) (Washington conviction of
residential burglary, in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.025(1),
is not a "burglary of a dwelling" crime of violence
as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), since the statute classifies
railway cars, fenced areas, and cargo containers as dwellings
although they are not structures under Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S.
United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. Aug.
12, 2002) (California conviction of second-degree burglary,
in violation of California Penal Code § 459, was an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G),
for purposes of imposition of a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement
under U.S.S.G.