Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2007) ("We accord Chevron deference to the BIA's construction of ambiguous statutory terms in immigration law, such as "moral turpitude." See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 262-65 (2d Cir. 2000) (deferring to the BIA's rule that crimes for which knowledge is an element are generally CIMTs). "However, as we recognized in Michel, 206 F.3d at 262, the BIA has no expertise in construing ...

Puello v. BCIS, 511 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2007) (under INA 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(8), the date of conviction is the date of sentence: "In sum, we hold that, under the plain meaning of the definition of "conviction" in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), the entry of a "formal judgment of guilt . . . by a court" occurs when judgment is entered on the docket, not when a defendant pleads guilty."); see Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 562 (3d Cir. 2002) (the date of conviction under the INA is the date of either sentencing or entry of judgment on the docket); Abimbola v.

Puello v. BCIS, 511 F.3d 324, ___, (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2007) (a statute must be construed to give meaning to each part and not render any part superfluous); see Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a notation of "guilty-filed" on the criminal docket could not constitute a conviction under the first prong of the INA conviction definition because "a formal judgment of guilt under the first prong of the definition entails a showing of something beyond a simple finding of guilt . . . .

Puello v. BCIS, 511 F.3d 324, ___ (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 2007) (a criminal court's order withdrawing a plea eliminates the conviction for mmigration purposes; an interpretation of the statutory definition [of conviction to the ontrary] appears to lead to the bizarre result that a withdrawn guilty plea would still be a "conviction" for immigration purposes, because the "conviction" would be established on the date of the entry of the plea. We reject this reading because "[a] statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids absurd results."), citing United States v.

Hussain v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. Dec. 18, 2007) (8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars the appellate court from ordering the release of a noncitizen pending judicial review of the order of removal), following Bolante v. Keisler, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 3170144 (7th Cir. Oct.31, 2007).

United States v. Rojas-Gutierrez, 510 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. Dec. 13, 2007) (California conviction of assault with intent to commit certain enumerated felonies, including mayhem, rape, sodomy and oral copulation, in violation of Penal Code 220(a), constituted a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of aggravated assault includes "assault with intent to commit a felony.").

Matter of Thomas, 24 I.& N. Dec. 416, 418-419 (BIA Dec. 13, 2007) (Florida conviction for simple possession, in violation of Fla. Stat. 893.13(6)(a), which is a second possession conviction for the defendant, cannot constitute an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), for immigration purposes, where there is no evidence that the court imposed additional punishment on basis of, or was even aware of, prior possession conviction; applying Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec.

Matter of Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 382 (BIA Dec. 13, 2007) (en banc) (whether a State drug conviction constitutes an "aggravated felony" by virtue of its correspondence to the Federal felony of "recidivist possession" is a criminal law question that must be determined in accordance with the decisional authority of the Supreme Court and the relevant Federal circuit courts of appeals, where such authority exists).

Entry of a plea under North Carolina v. Alford, does not alter the immigration nature of the conviction, but it might make it easier for the court and prosecution to avoid insisting on making a record of the factual basis for the plea that would expand the nature of the conviction sufficiently to trigger a ground of deportation. Since an Alford plea is entered without any factual admission of guilt, the court and prosecution may allow entry of the plea without establishing any factual basis for the plea.

Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2007) (California conviction of unauthorized driving of a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code 10851(a), constitutes an aggravated felony theft offense, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C.