Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. Feb. 6, 2008) ("when the DHS opposes a motion to reopen, the BIA may not deny the motion based solely on the fact of the DHS's objection. Moreover, if the BIA denies a motion to reopen based on the merits of the DHS's objection, the BIA must provide adequate reasoning as to why the objection calls for denial of the motion to reopen in the exercise of discretion, in order to provide a meaningful opportunity for judicial review.").

United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2008) (California conviction of statutory rape, under Penal Code 261.5(c), was sexual abuse of a minor for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, even though conviction statute was overbroad, where dismissed charge indicated that the victim was 14 years old).

United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2008) (California conviction of statutory rape, under Penal Code 261.5(c), was sexual abuse of a minor for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, even though conviction statute was overbroad, where dismissed charge indicated that the victim was 14 years old).

Matter of Aruna, 24 I.& N. Dec. 452 (BIA 2008) (Maryland misdemeanor conviction for violation of Maryland Criminal Law 5-602, distribution of a controlled substance, is an drug trafficking aggravated felony because the offense would be a felony if prosecuted under federal law; 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(4), which treats distribution of a small amount of marijuana without remuneration as a misdemeanor is not a separate federal offense, but rather a "mitigating exception" to the federal felony offense; therefore the categorical analysis is inapplicable to that section).

Matter of Aruna, 24 I.& N. Dec. 452 (BIA 2008) (Maryland misdemeanor conviction for violation of Maryland Criminal Law 5-602, distribution of a controlled substance, is an drug trafficking aggravated felony because the offense would be a felony if prosecuted under federal law; 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(4), which treats distribution of a small amount of marijuana without remuneration as a misdemeanor is not a separate federal offense, but rather a "mitigating exception" to the federal felony offense; therefore the categorical analysis is inapplicable to that section).

United States v. Lopez-Menera, ___ F.Supp. __ (N.D.Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) ("Because the IJ's failure to inform defendant of his eligibility for voluntary departure violated his due process rights, and because this violation caused defendant prejudice, the underlying order of deportation cannot be used as an element of a conviction under 1326.").

Solis v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 2008) (police report, although hearsay, was allowed into evidence for purposes of rebutting respondents version of the underlying facts of controlled substances conviction in determining whether the conviction was for a particularly serious crime).

United States v. Tellez-Martinez, 517 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. Feb.

Walcott v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 2008) (" 212(c) relief remains available to an alien ordered removed for a pre-AEDPA conviction that was on appeal when the AEDPA took effect, provided that the alien can prove detrimental reliance of the type recognized in Restrepo. Under Wilson, Petitioner is entitled to try and prove his Restrepo claim of reliance before an immigration judge."), see Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111 (2006).

Acevedo-Aguilar v. Gonzales, 517 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 2008) (noncitizen bears burden of establishing continuous presence for non-LPR cancellation purposes, including proving lack of absence from the United States for more than 90 days).