United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 528 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. Jun.12, 2008) (California conviction of robbery, in violation of Penal Code 211, constituted crime of violence, for purposes of 16-level enhancement of illegal reentry sentence under USSG 2L1.2(b), which contains no reference to 18 U.S.C. 16(b)), distinguishing United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding California robbery, under Penal Code 211, constituted a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2 commentary language as well as 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 528 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. Jun.12, 2008) (Guidelines definitions of crime of violence differ from immigration definition and from each other); United States v. Beltran-Mungia, 489 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir.

United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 528 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. Jun. 12, 2008) (to show conviction does not fall within ground of removal, noncitizen must show reasonable probability that the state would apply its statute to conduct outside the generic definition, which in the Ninth Circuit can be done by showing that the text of the state statute expressly includes a broader range of conduct than the Guideline: "In Duenas-Alvarez, the defendant's argument relied not on the express text of the statute at issue, but on how state courts might conceivably apply it.

People v. Coulter, 163 Cal.App.4th 1117 (Jun. 10, 2008) (possible, in some cases, for trial court, with express or implied consent of the defendant, to put the issue of factual basis for a guilty plea over to the sentencing hearing).

Paredes v. Attorney General of U.S., 528 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. Jun. 9, 2008) ("pendency of post-conviction motions or other forms of collateral attack . . . does not vitiate finality [of a conviction for removal purposes], unless and until the convictions are overturned as a result of the collateral motions."), citing United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2004); Grageda v. INS, 12 F .3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1993); Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir. 1982); Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 1971).

New AILF practice advisory: Trina Realmuto, "Finality" of Removal Orders for Judicial Review Purposes (June 23, 2008). Addressing whether a BIA remand, for example, affects the "finality" of a removal order.
http://www.ailf.org/lac/pa/lac_pa_finrem.pdf

Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. Jun. 20, 2008)
(Massachusetts conviction of possession with intent to distribute a Class D substance (marijuana), in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32C(a), constituted aggravated felony drug trafficking conviction, under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), for purposes of the aggravated felony disqualification from eligibility for cancellation of removal for LPRs, rejecting the argument that the offense would have been treated as a misdemeanor pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

Kirong v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. Jun. 20, 2008) (although courts lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary denial of relief, court retained jurisdiction to review statutory ground of denial where the statutory basis for denial could result in the noncitizen being permanently inadmissible to the United States).

Kirong v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. Jun. 20, 2008) (noncitizen seeking to adjust status as a defense to removal must establish clearly and beyond doubt that he is not inadmissible to the United States).

Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. Jun.18, 2008) (IJ's seeming bias against the petitioner and reliance on unfounded assumptions about homosexuals deprived the petitioner of his right to a fair hearing).