Bugayong v. INS, 442 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2006) (per curiam) (denial of adjustment of status and INA 212(h) waiver on discretionary basis not subject to judicial review; REAL ID Act of 2005, 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 310 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D)), does not override the jurisdiction-denying provision of 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0256751p.pdf

When an administrative agency inexplicably departs from past practices, precedents, and/or established procedures, it abuses its discretion. Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1994) (BIA abused discretion by changing its position without explanation re: 212(c) tolling period); Gonzalez-Batoun v. INS, 791 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1986) (BIA abused discretion when it gave no reason for deviation from past practice); Salehpour v. INS, 761 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1985) (abuse of discretion occurs where agency interpretation is inconsistent with its own regulations); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U. S.

Khan v. Attorney General, 448 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. May 22, 2006) (court of appeals jurisdiction to consider arguments that BIA erred in affirming denial of request for continuance of removal hearing as abuse of discretion and as a violation of due process).

Solano-Chicas v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. Mar. 17, 2006) (where BIA reverses an immigration judge's ruling granting cancellation of removal, the BIA has authority to order removal directly without remand to the IJ).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/043373p.pdf

Savoury v. U.S. Attorney General, 449 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. May 25, 2006) (doctrine of laches is inapplicable against government who admitted respondent as LPR despite knowledge of a controlled substances conviction, and later sought to exclude him when he arrived from a trip abroad: "Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever indicated that laches applies against the government.

Francis v. Gonzalez, 442 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2006) (Special Agricultural Workers Program automatically adjusted applicants without regard to admissibility at the time of adjustment).

Yepez-Razo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2006) (lawful permanent resident was able to show lawful residence in the United States for purposes of INA 212(h) relief despite out of status period because she was prima facie eligible for Family Unity treatment, and the out of status period was caused in part by an improper denial of the relief by the INS; any period under the Family Unity program is not to be counted as unlawful presence. INA 212(a)(9)(B)(iii)(III)).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0372005p.pdf

United States v. Camacho-Lopez, 450 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. May 30, 2006) (California conviction for vehicular manslaughter, in violation of California Penal Code 191.5(a) is not an aggravated felony crime of violence, in light of Leocal, for immigration purposes; Immigration Judge therefore improperly advised noncitizen that he was not eligible for relief; conviction for illegal re-entry following removal therefore cannot be sustained.)

United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2006) (for purposes of brining a collateral attack of the underlying deportation order in prosecution for illegal re-entry, the IJ and BIA affirmatively misleading the noncitizen regarding eligibility for relief resulted in an improper denial of the opportunity for judicial review, as required to bring a collateral attack under 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)).

United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2006) (noncitizen sentenced to 4-6 years for delivery of a controlled substance, with a further court order suggesting immediate deportation if deemed appropriate by the DHS, and actually deported 26 days later, is considered to have been sentenced to 6 years imprisonment for purposes of illegal re-entry sentencing enhancement; court rejected argument that order for immediate deportation was essentially an alternative suspended sentence).