United States v. Nguyen, 465 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2006) (federal conviction under 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, 434 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 2006) (a guilty plea is an admission of the facts charged in the indictment, and an Alford plea, in which the defendant enters a guilty plea while maintaining his innocence, is nevertheless a guilty plea under Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1990)).

United States v. Pereira, 465 F.3d515, 2006 WL 2925642 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2006)( New York conviction of robbery, with term of imprisonment of 62 months, constituted aggravated felony conviction for purposes of 16-level illegal reentry sentence enhancement, even though the defendant was adjudicated a youthful offender under New York State law).

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/2nd/055969p.pdf

Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 2006 WL 2846379 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2006) (California convictions of simple battery on the mother of defendant's child, in violation of Penal Code 243(e)(1), were not categorically crimes of moral turpitude since the least touching was sufficient to violate the statute, and the domestic relationship, standing alone, was insufficient to establish moral turpitude).

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2006) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats. 13-1203(A)(1) ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2006) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats. 13-1203(A)(1) ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Smith v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2006) (second state misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana did not qualify as an "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes because second possession only becomes a felony under federal law upon conviction of a second offense after conviction of a prior simple possession; in this case, there was no effective prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. 844(a) because the first conviction was not yet final).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0660020cv0p.pdf

Smith v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3012856 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2006) (for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, a conviction does not become final until time for direct appeal and time for discretionary review have elapsed).



NOTE: This case can be cited to support the position that a second controlled substances offense may be expunged under Lujan in the Ninth Circuit as long as the first conviction had not become final by the time of the second conviction.

The federal offence of theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641, is defined as follows:

Theft under California Penal Code 484 does not require in every case the intent to carry away or to deprive the owner of the property permanently. It therefore is not categorically a CMT. While CALJIC 14.02 states that theft by larceny under Penal Code 487 is committed by "every person who steals, takes, carries" . . .