United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d 470, 472-473 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (Illinois conviction of aggravated battery, under 720 ILCS 5/12-4(b), is not categorically a crime of violence, within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), since Illinois aggravated battery may include non-violent offenses, such as spitting on another person while standing on a sidewalk).

Matter of Gruenangerl, 25 I. & N. Dec. 351, 356 (BIA 2010) (federal conviction of bribery of a public official, for the purpose of influencing official action, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1)(A), is not an offense relating to commercial bribery and is therefore not an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R)).

Although the BIA did not specify a definition of commercial bribery that it would officially adopt for aggravated felony purpose, the court cited the following definitions in finding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1)(A), bribery of a public official, was not an aggravated felony commercial bribery offense:

Blacks Law Dictionary 204 (8th ed. 2004) defines commercial bribery as follows:

1. The knowing solicitation or acceptance of a benefit in exchange for violating an oath of fidelity, such as that owed by an employee, partner, trustee, or attorney.

Thomas v. Attorney General of U.S., 625 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2010) (New York misdemeanor conviction for fourth-degree criminal sale of marijuana, in violation of Penal Law 221.40, is a divisible statute [to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another], only sale of which categorically falls within the hypothetical federal felony test of drug trafficking crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jul. 7, 2011) (California conviction of second-degree commercial burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, did not categorically constitute an attempted theft aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), because 459 criminalizes conduct beyond generic attempted theft offenses"for example, entering a locked vehicle with the intent to commit not theft, but arson or vandalism. . . .

Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jul.7, 2011) (California conviction of second-degree commercial burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, did not constitute attempted theft aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), under the modified categorical analysis, because [s]imply entering a commercial building . . . is not in itself a substantial step supporting attempted theft liability.).

Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (9th Cir. Jul.7, 2011) (Ngaeth defined a generic attempted theft offense as having two elements: [1] an intent to commit a theft offense, of the sort generically defined by [our precedent], coupled with [2] an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the offense.); quoting Ngaeth v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 796, 800, 801 (9th Cir.

Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (9th Cir. Jul. 7, 2011) (California conviction of second-degree commercial burglary, in violation of Penal Code 459, did not constitute a crime of moral turpitude under the categorical or modified categorical analysis: To hold otherwise would mean that someone who did what Hernandez- Cruz admitted doing"walking into a commercial building with the intent to commit larceny"but then changed his mind and walked out without ever committing any crime, would be guilty of a CIMT.).

Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1294, 2011 WL 2547562 (10th Cir. Jun. 28, 2011) (government must establish by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds of removability are true: that is, that the criminal conviction was for possession of a substance that is not only listed under [state] law, but also contained in the federal schedules of [the Controlled Substances Act].); quoting Ruiz"Vidal v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072, 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(3) (knowingly possessing five or more identification documents with the intent unlawfully to use or transfer -- other than those issued lawfully for the use of the possessor, authentication documents or false identification documents).

Immigration counsel can argue that this offense is not a crime of moral turpitude, along the following lines.