Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 1166 (Feb. 21, 2012) (statutory definition of fraud aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), courts general test for whether the conviction was for an offense involving fraud or deceit was whether it was an offense with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct.).

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If the police reports and circumstances show that the person structured financial transactions knowing that she was aiding or colluding in trafficking, and the person cant controvert that she knew she was helping drug-trafficking, it could provide reason to believe illicit trafficking under INA 212(a)(2)(C)(i). There could be a relatively innocent reason for avoiding reporting requirements but it would have to be plausible enough to undermine the inference that she participated to knowingly assist drug trafficking. Counsel should examine the complete record of conviction.

The federal accessory-after-the-fact statute, 18 U.S.C. 3, can be a tool for creating misdemeanors. Any federal offense with a two-year maximum can be reduced to a misdemeanor (with a one-year maximum) by pleading to accessory after the fact to that offense. This is useful where it is important to have a misdemeanor conviction, rather than a felony. E.g., aggravated felony crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b); TPS felony disqualification. It is also useful to reduce a two-year maximum to a one-year maximum, to qualify for the Petty Offense Exception to CMT inadmissibility.

Totimeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (Minnesota conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. 243.166.5, defined the offense as knowingly violat[ing] any of [the statutes] provisions or intentionally provid[ing] false information, is not a crime of moral turpitude, since it is a regulatory offense designed to assist law enforcement, and does not regulate a crime that of itself is inherently vile or intentionally malicious.); following Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir.

Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 2012) (Virginia misdemeanor conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in violation of Virginia Code 18.2-371, did not categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude applying the modified categorical approach).

United States v. Reyes-Mendoza, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011) (California conviction of manufacturing a controlled substance, in violation of Health & Safety Code 11379.6, is not categorically a drug trafficking offense, under USSG 2L1.2 (which includes an offense under . . . state . . . law that prohibits the manufacture . . .

Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (California conviction of corporal injury of a spouse, in violation of Penal Code 273.5(a), did not categorically constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, because it includes victims other than a spouse); distinguishing Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.

Assault with a mens rea of negligence, with no element that the victim is a minor, and where the judicially noticeable record of conviction does not indicate minority of the victim, should not be considered a crime involving moral turpitude. Washington Assault in the Third Degree, a Class C felony, has two subsections that may be committed negligently. See Matter of Perez-Contreras 20 I&N Dec 615 (BIA 1992). A negligent assault is also not a crime of violence aggravated felony. See Leocal v. Ashcroft 543 US 1 (2004).
Thanks to Jonathan Moore.

False Bank Entries, 18 U.S.C. 1005
Statute is divisible and criminalizes false bank entries made with the "intent to injure or defraud." Immigration counsel might argue that guilty plea to an offense committed solely with "intent to injure" is not a crime involving moral turpitude: it cannot be fraud since "intent to injury" would then be redundant.