Gattem v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1422373 (7th Cir. June 20, 2005) (applying definition of "sexual abuse" at 18 U.S.C. 3509(a)(8), the court found that solicitation of a sexual act constitutes "sexual abuse," as that section includes "inducement, enticement, or coercion.") NOTE: This case is distinguishable from the Ninth Circuit cases, such as Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. Sep. 30, 1997) (Arizona conviction for solicitation to possess cocaine, under A.R.S.

Gattem v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1422373 (7th Cir. June 20, 2005) (applying definition of "sexual abuse" at 18 U.S.C. 3509(a)(8), the court found that solicitation of a sexual act constitutes "sexual abuse," as that section includes "inducement, enticement, or coercion.") NOTE: This case is distinguishable from the Ninth Circuit cases, such as Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. Sep. 30, 1997) (Arizona conviction for solicitation to possess cocaine, under A.R.S.

Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. Aug. 27, 2004) (Fifth Circuit rejected reasoning of Coronado-Durazo, holding a conviction of solicitation to transport marijuana for sale constituted a conviction of an offense relating to a controlled substance)

8 C.F.R. 244.1 provides: As used in this Part [relating to Temporary Protected Status]: Felony means a crime committed in the United States, punishable by imprisonment for a term of more than one year, regardless of the term such alien actually served, if any, except: When the offense is defined by the State as a misdemeanor and the sentence actually imposed is one year or less regardless of the term such alien actually served. Under this exception for purposes of section 244 of the Act, the crime shall be treated as a misdemeanor. . . .

Tran v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1620320 (3d Cir. July 12, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction of "reckless burning or exploding," in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3301(d)(2), did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and was therefore not an aggravated felony crime of violence under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of removal, since the crime required only a reckless mens rea, and involved no risk that the defendant would intentionally use force in the commission of the crime).

United States v. Duncan, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24292 (D.Conn.

United States v. Karaouni, 379 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2004) ("There are three essential elements of a 911 violation. The government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Karaouni made a false claim of U.S. citizenship; (2) his misrepresentation was willful (i.e. voluntary and deliberate); and (3) it was conveyed to someone with good reason to inquire into his citizenship status. United States v. Romero-Avila, 210 F.3d 1017, 1020-21 (9th Cir.2000); Chow Bing Kew v. United States, 248 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir.1957).

United States v. Karaouni, 379 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2004) (federal conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. 911 reversed, since, by checking box on an INS I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form next to the following printed statement: "I attest, under penalty of perjury, that I am ...

Answering "Yes" to the question, "Were you born in the U.S.?" is not the equivalent of making a false claim to United States citizenship. This is a defense to a criminal charge of making a false claim to U.S. citizenship. 8 U.S.C. 911. A person could be born in the United States and subsequently renounce citizenship or be expatriated. A child of a diplomat can be born in the United States, yet not be a citizen of the United States. Thanks to Barbara Hines for this information.

It is possible to argue that a deferred prosecution agreement does not constitute a conviction under the IIRAIRA statutory definition of conviction for immigration purposes, provided the court does not order any restraint of the defendant during the deferred-prosecution period, but merely approves the agreement between the parties. Thanks to Jennifer Foster for this argument.