Smith v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3012856 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2006) (for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, a conviction does not become final until time for direct appeal and time for discretionary review have elapsed).



NOTE: This case can be cited to support the position that a second controlled substances offense may be expunged under Lujan in the Ninth Circuit as long as the first conviction had not become final by the time of the second conviction.

The federal offence of theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641, is defined as follows:

Theft under California Penal Code 484 does not require in every case the intent to carry away or to deprive the owner of the property permanently. It therefore is not categorically a CMT. While CALJIC 14.02 states that theft by larceny under Penal Code 487 is committed by "every person who steals, takes, carries" . . .

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2006) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats. 13-1203(A)(1) ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2006) (Arizona conviction of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stats. 13-1203(A)(1) ["[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing any physical injury to another"], did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a), and is therefore not a domestic violence conviction, within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C.

Wallace v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 2588018 (2nd Cir. Sept. 1, 2006) (adjudication as a "Youthful Offender" under New York State criminal law, N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law 720.10-720.35, may be used in determining whether noncitizen should be granted adjustment of status as a matter of discretion, even those the adjudication is not a "conviction" for removability purposes).

United States v. Fierro-Reyna, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Sept. 28, 2006) (Texas conviction from 1979 for aggravated assault on a police officer, in violation of Penal Code 22.02(a)(2) (1974) [punishing simple assault on a police officer] is not a "crime of violence" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since simple assault does not necessarily require use of force; state classification of assault as aggravated because it is committed against a police officer is irrelevant).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0551198cr0p.pdf

http://criminalandimmigrationlaw.com/~crimwcom/public/articles/new_depor...

Smith v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2006) (second state misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana did not qualify as an "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes because second possession only becomes a felony under federal law upon conviction of a second offense after conviction of a prior simple possession; in this case, there was no effective prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. 844(a) because the first conviction was not yet final).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0660020cv0p.pdf

Matter of Robles, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA Sept. 27, 2006) (federal conviction of misprison of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4, constitutes crime of moral turpitude, since mere failure to report an offense is insufficient; offense requires affirmative conduct of concealment, contrary to the duties owed to society; "evil intent" is implicit in statutory requirement that offender take affirmative step to conceal a felony from the proper authorities).



This decision is very badly reasoned, for the reasons given in the dissent in Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.